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Federal law grants owners of intellectual property rights different de-
grees of control over parallel imports depending on the nature of their
exclusive rights. While trademark owners enjoy strong control over un-
authorized imports bearing their marks, their protection is less compre-
hensive than that granted to owners of copyrights and patents. To
broaden their rights, some trademark owners have incorporated copy-
righted material into their products or packaging, enabling them to
block otherwise lawful imports in contravention of the policies underly-
ing trademark law. A 2013 Supreme Court decision has significantly
narrowed the importation ban of copyright law, but there may be pres-
sure to reinstate it. In the meantime, trademark owners could resort to
design patents to achieve their goals.
Trademark owners have employed the same copyright strategy abroad,
in countries with similar asymmetries in their intellectual property re-
gimes. In Canada and South Africa, courts have considered but ulti-
mately rejected judicial remedies that would restrict the use of
copyright law to override trademark law. Australia and Singapore have
addressed the problem through parallel import legislation which disre-
gards the copyrighted material embodied in mere “accessories” to im-
ported goods.  This legislation  has already given rise to questions of
interpretation.
If Congress chooses to restore parallel import restrictions on copy-
righted works, enabling trademark owners once again to use copyright
law as a mutant form of trademark law, existing doctrines such as cop-
yright and patent misuse, de minimis use, and fair use will  not offer the
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clarity and predictability necessary for a long-term solution. Instead, a
legislative response is needed. Drawing on lessons from other jurisdic-
tions, the Author proposes amendments to the federal copyright and
design patent laws which will enable the legal status of most parallel
imports to be assessed despite the presence of incidental material pro-
tected by copyrights or design patents. This approach will restore the
preeminence of trademark law as the proper mechanism for balancing
the legitimate interests of trademark owners and consumers.
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INTRODUCTION
Parallel imports (also known as gray market goods)1 are genuine trade-
marked goods purchased in one country and then imported into a second
country for resale without the consent of the party that owns the trademark
in the country of import.2 Because of their lower acquisition costs, the goods
are typically resold in the import country at prices lower than the prices
demanded by the authorized distributors in that country. Trademark laws
that regulate parallel imports attempt to strike a balance between protecting
1. Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 45 n.1 (3d Cir. 1991).
2. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 29:46 (4th ed. 2013); See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 281 (1988).
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the rights of trademark owners and ensuring competitive markets for con-
sumer goods.
Parallel imports can harm domestic trademark owners in a number of
ways. Trademark owners often sell their products more cheaply to overseas
distributors because the trademark owner does not provide advertising and
market support in those jurisdictions, or because of other differences in mar-
ket or regulatory conditions.3 When those cheaper goods are sold in the
United States, they “free ride” on the U.S. marketing support that has been
paid for by the authorized U.S. distributors whose prices they often under-
cut; this undermines the relationship between the trademark owner and its
distributors.4 The foreign goods may not have the same quality or character-
istics as the domestic goods, because of differences in manufacturing, pack-
aging, handling, or transport. These differences can harm unsuspecting
consumers if the imported merchandise is inferior or has different character-
istics compared to the domestic version.5 If consumers are disappointed, this
can also damage the reputation of the trademark owner.6 In addition, harm
can occur even when the products are physically identical. The purchaser of
the imported good may contact the domestic trademark owner for warranty
service, not realizing that the product does not have a U.S. warranty; upon
learning that warranty service is not available, the customer may blame the
domestic trademark owner for failing to stand behind “its” product. Due to
these concerns, courts have held that, when a U.S. company purchases do-
mestic trademark rights from a foreign company, the latter should be pre-
vented from “evading the purpose of the transfer” by selling the trademarked
goods to third parties for importation into the United States.7 Finally, some
intellectual property owners may set their retail prices lower in less devel-
oped countries to reflect local economic conditions, such as lower per capita
incomes.8 In the absence of parallel import restrictions, a seller would lose
3. See ROSE ANN MACGILLIVRAY, PARALLEL IMPORTATION 19-21, 26-28 (2010) (dis-
cussing economic theory and external causes underlying territorial price discrimination);
SWEDISH COMPETITION AUTH., PARALLEL IMPORTS—EFFECTS OF THE SILHOUETTE RULING 28-
29 (1999) (factors leading to price differences include cultural and historical differences, local
purchasing power, insurance systems, charges, taxes, price controls, and foreign exchange
rates).
4. See SWEDISH COMPETITION AUTH., supra note 3, at 28-29; see also Ross Q. Panko,
Misuse of Copyright Misuse Doctrine?, 4 LANDSLIDE 18, 19 (July/Aug. 2012).
5. INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, TRADEMARK OWNER’S GUIDE TO PARALLEL IMPORTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 2-3 (2012) [hereinafter INTA GUIDE].
6. Stephen Stern & Wen Wu, Parallel Importation: Damage Control, MANAGING IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY (March 1, 2012), http://www.managingip.com/Article/2987278/Paral-
lel-importation-Damage-control.html; see NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506,
1509 (9th Cir. 1987); Panko, supra note 4, at 19.
7. Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 484 (9th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Bourjois v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 691 (1923)).
8. Joan-Ramon Borrell, Pricing and Patents of HIV/AIDS Drugs in Developing Coun-
tries, 39 APPLIED ECON. 505 (2007); IRIN, HIV and Aids: Bad News for Drug Prices in Mid-
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this ability to price discriminate.9 This could force the seller to raise prices in
those countries, to the detriment of their consumers.10 Considerations such as
these have led the United States to grant trademark owners strong protection
against parallel imports of their branded goods.11
On the other hand, the absence of parallel import restrictions can benefit
consumers by reducing prices.12 In Australia, the elimination of parallel im-
port restrictions on sound recordings in 1998 was immediately followed by
an 8% reduction in CD prices.13 A 2004 study found similar results in other
countries.14 Regardless of whether authorized distributors lower their own
prices in order to compete, parallel imports at least offer consumers a lower-
priced alternative. In Singapore, where parallel imports of genuine trade-
marked or copyrighted goods are unrestricted, Coca Cola prices in 2008
were 33.6% higher from domestic bottlers than from parallel importers,15
CDs from authorized domestic distributors cost nearly twice as much as law-
fully made CDs imported from China,16 and a 2000 study showed that prices
of BMW and Mercedes-Benz vehicles were 8.5% higher from authorized
dealers than from parallel importers.17 Unauthorized imports of genuine
brand name fashions may be significantly cheaper than those sold by author-
ized distributors.18 Similar disparities exist in the pricing of consumer elec-
dle-Income Countries, THE GUARDIAN, July 22, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-
development/2011/jul/22/hiv-aids-antiretroviral-drugs-pricing; Tamar Lewin, Students Find
$100 Textbooks Cost $50, Purchased Overseas, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2003), http://www.ny-
times.com/2003/10/21/us/students-find-100-textbooks-cost-50-purchased-overseas.html?page-
wanted=all&src=pm.
9. Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the DOHA
“Solution”, 3 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 47, 64 (2002).
10. Id.
11. See infra notes 37-68 and accompanying text.
12. Duncan Matthews & Viviana Munoz-Tellez, Parallel Trade: A User’s Guide, in
HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 1429 (2007), available at http://www.iphandbook.org/hand-
book/ch15/p04/; M. Hawin, Parallel Importation of Copyright Material: A Comparative Anal-
ysis of the Position in Several Asian Countries, 1 ASIAN L. REV. 69, 79-80 (2004).
13. AUSTL. GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, RESTRICTIONS ON THE PARALLEL IMPORTA-
TION OF BOOKS app. C.1–C.3 (June 2009) available at http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/
pdf_file/0004/90265/books.pdf.
14. Yeh-ning Chen & Ivan Png, Parallel Imports and Music CD Prices (Jan. 2004) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://www.econaa.com/resources/gray_price.pdf.
15. See Singapore Parallel Imports—A Glass of Ke Kou Ke Le Please, MIRANDAH CON-
NECTING ASIA (July 2, 2008), http://www.mirandah.com/categories/item/72-singapore-parallel-
imports-a-glass-of-ke-kou-ke-le-please.html.
16. Id.
17. Karamjit Kaur, Continental Car Price Dip Likely, THE STRAITS TIMES, May
25, 2000, available at http://www.computerproducts.globalsources.com/TNTLIST/TRADE/
TRADELAW/PARLLELS.HTM.
18. Parallel Imports: Hardly the Full Monti, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 1999, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/187940.
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tronics,19 and even liquor.20 Consumers may be willing to tolerate minor
differences in imported merchandise in order to purchase brand name goods
at lower prices.21 In the United States, where parallel import restrictions also
apply to patented goods, prices for patented drugs have been among the
highest in the world, due to both differential pricing of patented drugs and
the greater availability of generic versions in some countries.22 Prior to Kirt-
saeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,23 U.S. import restrictions on copyrighted
works were especially noticeable in textbook prices. A 2003 article in the
New York Times reported that college students—and even some college
bookstores—were purchasing large numbers of textbooks overseas and
reselling them in the United States at substantially higher prices, sometimes
double their overseas purchase price.24 Concern over the impact on consum-
ers has led some countries to liberalize their parallel import restrictions
through legislation.25
While the term gray market goods typically refers to trademarked
goods, parallel import restrictions can also limit the importation of merchan-
dise protected by copyrights or by patents. This article considers the use of
copyright or patent law by trademark owners to block parallel imports that
would otherwise be permitted under current interpretations of trademark
law.
19. Elise Dalley, Parallel Imports, CHOICE, http://www.choice.com.au/reviews-and-
tests/money/shopping-and-legal/shopping/parallel-imports.aspx (June 19, 2012).
20. Mike Veseth, More Bad News for Australia: Parallel Imports, THE WINE ECONO-
MIST, http://wineeconomist.com/2010/12/22/more-bad-news-for-australia-parallel-imports/
(Dec. 22, 2010).
21. SWEDISH COMPETITION AUTH., supra note 3, at 30.
22. Borrell, supra note 8, at 514; Sykes, supra note 9, at 47; Monali J. Bhosle & Rajesh
Balkrishnan, Drug Reimportation Practices in the United States, 3 THERAPEUTICS & CLINICAL
RISK MGMT. 41, 41-46 (March 2007); INT’L FED’N OF HEALTH PLANS, 2012 COMPARATIVE
PRICE REPORT (March 26, 2013), available at http://static.squarespace.com/static/518a3cfe
e4b0a77d03a62c98/t/51dfd9f9e4b0d1d8067dcde2/1373624825901/2012%20iFHP%20Price%
20Report%20FINAL%20April%203.pdf; KEITH E. MASKUS, PARALLEL IMPORTS IN
PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION AND PRICES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
FINAL REPORT TO WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION 9 (2001), available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/ssa_maskus_pi.pdf; Donald L.
Bartlett & James B. Steele, Why Drugs Cost So Much, TIME (Feb. 2, 2004), available at http://
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,993223,00.html; Gina Kolata, Why Drugs Cost
More in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1991, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/24/
business/why-drugs-cost-more-in-us.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
23. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 U.S. 1351 (2013).
24. Lewin, supra note 8.
25. Libby Baulch, Recent Amendments to the Australian Copyright Act, 33 COPYRIGHT
BULL., 27 (1999) (Australia); MARK J. DAVISON ET AL., AUSTRALIAN INTELLECTUAL PROP.
LAW 286-91 (2012) (Australia); Shubha Ghosh, An Economic Analysis of the Common Control
Exception to Gray Market Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L. BUS. L. 373, 383 (1994); Hawin,
supra note 12, at 102-06 (Singapore); MACGILLIVRAY, supra note 3, at 57-60; see AUSTL.
GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 13, at 7.19.
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The TRIPS Agreement (Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights) allows individual member countries to set their own
policies regarding restrictions on parallel imports.26 Thus, each TRIPS coun-
try is free to determine for itself the extent to which its domestic copyright,
trademark, and patent owners should be able to control the importation of
authorized goods that were intended for distribution exclusively in other
territories.
In the United States and many other countries, trademark owners enjoy
strong protection against gray market goods, but cannot exclude them com-
pletely. Where there are gaps in trademark protection, trademark owners in-
creasingly have turned to copyright law to provide a sort of “mutant
trademark” protection.  In some countries, they have succeeded, while in
others their early successes have prompted judicial or legislative pushback.
Prior to the Kirtsaeng decision,27 copyright law offered U.S. copyright
owners a convenient escape from the limitations of trademark law. Embed-
ding even a small amount of copyrighted material into merchandise enabled
the copyright owners to block importations of goods that could otherwise
lawfully be imported into the United States. The copyright could subsist in
the trademark itself, if it satisfied the originality requirements of copyright
law. Alternatively, copyright could subsist in a component of the merchan-
dise or its packaging (such as a label, instructions, user manual, warranty
card, or software). This end run around the limitations of trademark law
became popular with trademark owners who wished to block third parties
from importing and reselling gray market goods that bore lawful trademarks
but were intended for sale only outside of the United States (usually at lower
prices).
While Kirtsaeng has curtailed this use of copyright law, at least for now,
some trademark owners may be able to obtain similar benefits under patent
law—especially the law of design patents. Federal law gives patent owners
the right to block unauthorized imports of their patented products. While
patents are more difficult and costly to obtain, and offer protection for a
much shorter term than copyrights, utility patents can protect product com-
ponents such as software, and design patents can protect ornamental features
of products and their packaging. Although the concept of exhaustion applies
to patents as well as copyrights,28 thus far the federal courts have held that
26. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 6, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; see MACGILLIVRAY, supra note 3, at 151 (not-
ing that the TRIPs parties were unable to reach a consensus on parallel imports even after eight
years of negotiations).
27. See infra notes 108-130 and accompanying text (discussing Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley
& Sons, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 1351(2013)).
28. The Supreme Court has long recognized the exhaustion doctrine in patent law. See
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). This has never been codified.
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exhaustion does not limit the right of a patent owner to block parallel
imports.29
Trademark owners have used copyright law to block otherwise lawful
parallel imports not only in the United States, but in other countries that take
similar approaches to the first sale rule and parallel imports.  In several of
these countries—Canada, Australia, Singapore and South Africa30—these
efforts have prompted courts and legislatures to reexamine their approach to
parallel imports of goods that incorporate relatively minor amounts of copy-
rightable expression. This article examines recent developments both in the
United States and overseas, and finds in the laws of Australia and Singapore
the inspiration for a legislative solution that would restore the primacy of
trademark law. While it appears that trademark owners have not yet resorted
to design patents as an alternative form of protection against parallel im-
ports, this article anticipates and addresses that possibility as well.
Part I describes the treatment of parallel imports under trademark, copy-
right, and patent law in the United States, focusing on trademark owners’
use of copyright protection for minor components of products or packaging
in order to block imports that are otherwise permissible under trademark
law. Part II examines how several foreign countries have addressed this
question. Part III draws lessons from these jurisdictions for the United States
and proposes a legislative solution.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BARRIERS TO PARALLEL
IMPORTS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Trademark Law
Under the first sale rule of trademark law, also known as the exhaustion
rule, the resale of genuine trademarked goods does not generally constitute
infringement.31 Trademarked goods are genuine, rather than counterfeit, if
they are made under the authority of the trademark owner, including any
licensees. In general, trademark law does not prohibit the sale of goods bear-
ing authorized trademarks, even if the trademark owner does not consent to
the sale.32 Goods which are resold as new (as opposed to used or recondi-
tioned goods), however, are not “genuine” for purposes of the first sale rule
if they are “materially different” from goods sold under the trademark
29. Fujifilm Corp. v. Benun, 605 F.3d 1366, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Jazz Photo Corp. v.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094. 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
30. See infra notes 174-2309 and accompanying text (discussing legal responses in
those countries).
31. Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., 988 F.2d 587, 590 (5th Cir.
1993).
32. Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 671 (1989).
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owner’s authority.33 The purpose of the material differences test is “to deter-
mine whether the allegedly infringing products are likely to injure the good-
will developed by the trademark owner in the trademarked goods.”34 When
the products sold by the alleged infringer are materially different but bear
identical trademarks, “consumers are likely to be confused about the quality
and nature of the trademarked goods.”35 Such material differences “are
likely to affect consumers’ perceptions of the desirability of the owner’s
goods,” leading to tarnishment of the “commercial magnetism” of the trade-
mark, thus injuring the trademark owner.36
The Lanham Act provides strong protection against parallel imports, al-
though it does not exclude all unauthorized imports of trademarked goods.
Four provisions allow trademark owners to prohibit importation and distri-
bution of licensed goods if there is a likelihood of consumer confusion.
These are: Section 32(1),37 allowing civil actions for infringement of regis-
tered marks; Section 43(a),38 allowing civil actions for infringement of unre-
gistered marks; Section 43(b),39 allowing civil actions to enjoin importation
of any goods likely to infringe or dilute registered or unregistered trade-
marks;40 and Section 42,41 which authorizes U.S. Customs and Border Pro-
tection (CBP) to prevent the importation of goods that infringe registered or
unregistered trademarks.
Most courts find a likelihood of confusion whenever the imported goods
are materially different from goods authorized for domestic sale under the
same trademark.42 In determining whether goods are materially different for
33. See, e.g., Beltronics USA Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib. LLC, 562 F.3d 1067,
1072 (10th Cir. 2009); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d
68, 73 (2d Cir. 1987).
34. Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 303 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Weil Ceram-
ics, 878 F.2d at 671).
35. Id. (citing Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633,
641 (1st Cir. 1992)).
36. Id. (citing Weil Ceramics, 878 F.2d at 671; Martin’s Herend Imports, Inc. v. Dia-
mond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112 F.3d 1296, 1302 (5th Cir. 1997); Mishawaka Rubber &
Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942)).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2012).
38. Id. § 1125(a).
39. Id. § 1125(b).
40. Regulations under Section 43(b) allow infringing imports to be seized and forfeited.
19 C.F.R. § 11.13 (2013).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1124. A claim for dilution allows the owner of a famous trademark to
sue a defendant that uses the mark in a way that weakens the distinctiveness or tarnishes the
reputation of the famous mark, even if there is no likelihood of confusion as to origin. Id.
§ 1125(c). Parallel import cases generally have not involved dilution claims.
42. Zino DavidoffSA v. CVS Corp., 571 F.3d 238, 246 (2d Cir. 2009); Bourdeau Bros.
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 444 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Martin’s Herend Imports, Inc.
v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, 112 F.3d 1296, 1301-02 (5th Cir. 1997); Lever Bros. Co. v.
United States, 981 F.2d 1330, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Societe des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa
Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 641 (1st Cir. 1992); Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d
101, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816
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this purpose, courts have held that even “subtle differences” are enough be-
cause there is a “low threshold of materiality.”43 Material differences have
been broadly interpreted to include: different warranties,44 Cabbage Patch
dolls with Spanish language birth certificates and adoption papers,45 differ-
ent soap ingredients,46 TIC TACS with a different size and different calorie
counts,47 chocolates with different shapes,48 quality control differences,49
packaging or labeling differences,50 or different advertising participation or
marketing methods.51 According to several courts, the use of packaging that
identifies the country of origin does not mitigate the likelihood of confusion
arising from these material differences.52 Courts do not always agree, how-
ever, on whether particular differences are material.53
Courts have also held that Sections 32 and 43(a) cannot be invoked to
block importation of goods manufactured by a corporate affiliate of the U.S.
F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1987); Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Cigarettes for Less, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1181,
1189 (N.D. Cal. 1999), aff’d, 215 F.3d 1333 (9th Cir. 2000); Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Allen
Distribs., Inc., 48 F. Supp.2d 844, 850-52 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
43. Societe des Produits Nestle, 982 F.2d at 641; accord, Zino Davidoff, 571 F.3d at
243, 246 (“In the context of gray-market goods, . . . we apply a low threshold of materiality,
requiring no more than a slight difference which consumers would likely deem relevant when
considering a purchase of the product.”).
44. Societe des Produits Nestle, 982 F.2d at 639 n.7.
45. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc., 816 F.2d at 73.
46. Lever Bros. Co., 877 F.2d at 103, 108; Dial Corp. v. Encina Corp., 643 F. Supp.
951, 952 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
47. Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1240, 1243, 1247 (D.N.J.),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 935 F.2d. 1281 (3rd Cir. 1991) (reversing only on the issue of
attorney fees).
48. Societe des Produits Nestle, 982 F.2d at 643.
49. Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1998) (gray market
goods); Davidoff & Cie, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1302 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001)
(non-imported goods); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 5 (2d Cir.
1996) (nonimported goods); Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 106
(4th Cir. 1991) (nonimported goods); El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806
F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir. 1986) (gray market goods); Adolph Coors Co. v. A. Genderson & Sons,
Inc., 486 F. Supp. 131, 133 (D. Colo. 1980) (nonimported goods).
50. Zino Davidoff SA v. CVS Corp., 571 F.3d 238, 243, 246 (2d Cir. 2009) (removal of
UPC codes from product packaging of gray market goods); Shell Oil, 928 F.2d at 106; David-
off & Cie, 263 F.3d at 1299; John Paul Mitchell Sys. v. Pete-N-Larry’s, Inc., 862 F. Supp.
1020, 1027 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Nostalgia Prods. Corp., No. 90 C 7024, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18990, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 1990); El Greco, 806 F.2d at 394; Adolph
Coors, 486 F. Supp. at 133.
51. Nostalgia Prods., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18990, at *4; PepsiCo, Inc. v. Giraud, No.
87-01887(JP), 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12864, at *7-8 (D.P.R. Mar. 14, 1988).
52. Societe des Produits Nestle, 982 F.2d at 643; Ferrero U.S.A., 753 F. Supp. at 1243,
aff’d, 935 F.2d 1281.
53. See Graham Webb Int’l Ltd. v. Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 909, 910
(E.D. Ark. 1995) (removal of batch codes from hair care products was not a material differ-
ence where it did not significantly affect overall appearance of product, and thus would not
materially affect consumer decision to purchase); John Paul Mitchell Systems v. Randall’s
Food Markets, Inc., 17 S.W.3d 721, 721 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (similar).
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trademark owner (for example, a foreign subsidiary),54 because the corporate
affiliation ensures that the domestic trademark owner had sufficient quality
control over the imported goods.55
Trademark owners enjoy additional protection under Section 42 of the
Lanham Act, which authorizes the CBP to block the importation of goods
that “copy or simulate” either a registered trademark or the trade name of a
domestic manufacturer even if unregistered.56 A mark may be found to
“copy or simulate” another mark even if it is not counterfeit.57 Section 42
does not, however, bar parallel imports of genuine goods unless they are
materially different from those authorized for domestic sale.58
CBP will block importation of trademarked goods under Section 42 only
if the trademark owner applies for protection and demonstrates that the
goods are physically and materially different from the goods authorized for
domestic sale.59 The importer can overcome this rule and import the goods,
however, by affixing a prominent disclaimer that states: “This product is not
a product authorized by the United States trademark owner for importation
54. NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1510 (9th Cir. 1987).
55. Id. at 1510.
56. There is an exception for goods that accompany a person entering the United States,
if they are for his or her personal use. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (2012); 19 U.S.C. § 1526(d) (2012).
To obtain the benefits of Section 42, the trademark owner must record the trademark or trade
name with the CBP. 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.0-133.15 (2013).
57. Under CBP regulations, a mark may “copy or simulate” another mark if it “so re-
semble[s] a recorded mark or name as to be likely to cause the public to associate the copying
or simulating mark or name with the recorded mark or name.” 19 C.F.R. § 133.22(a). In con-
trast, a counterfeit mark is “a spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially indistin-
guishable from, a registered mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The degree of resemblance must be
higher for a mark to be considered counterfeit. Thus, Section 42 can block the importation of
materially different goods bearing either identical or confusingly similar marks.
58. In the 1980s, two circuits held that Section 42 does not apply to parallel imports;
because these are genuine goods authorized to display the trademark, they do not “copy or
simulate” the trademark. See Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 660 (3d Cir.
1989); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 315 (2d Cir. 1986); 5 MCCARTHY,
supra note 2, § 29:50. In the 1990s, however, the D.C. Circuit and the First Circuit both held
that parallel imports bearing noncounterfeit marks may still violate Section 42 if they are
materially different from the goods that are authorized for sale under the same mark. Lever
Bros. Co. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[P]hysically, materially
different goods”); Societe des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 639
(1st Cir. 1992) (“[P]hysical or like material differences”). The D.C. Circuit held that Section
42 bars importation of “physically, materially different goods” even if they were made by a
corporate affiliate of the U.S. trademark owner. Lever Bros., 981 F.2d at 1338.
59. This rule, developed in response to Lever Bros., is codified in the CBP regulations
at 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.2-133.27. Under these regulations, physical and material differences may
include: (1) composition; (2) formulation, product construction, structure, or composite prod-
uct components; (3) performance and/or operational characteristics; (4) differences resulting
from legal or regulatory requirements, certification, etc.; and (5) “Other distinguishing and
explicitly defined factors that would likely result in consumer deception or confusion[.]” Id.
§ 133.2(e).
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and is physically and materially different from the authorized product.”60
The disclaimer must be “designed to remain on the product until the first
point of sale to a retail customer in the United States.”61 Some trademark
owners may find the labeling remedy unsatisfactory, however, because the
labeled goods can still be sold to consumers, and if the trademark owner
brings an infringement action under Sections 32 or 43(a), it is difficult to
predict whether and to what extent a court could find that the label weighs
against the likelihood of consumer confusion.62
In addition to the Lanham Act provisions, Section 526 of the 1930 Tariff
Act63 plays a role in blocking parallel imports of trademarked goods. Section
526 prevents importation of genuine goods bearing a registered trademark
that is owned by a U.S. person without that person’s written consent.64 Sec-
tion 526 applies even if the goods are identical (meaning that there are no
material differences), and even if there is no likelihood of confusion. Unlike
the Lanham Act, however, Section 526 applies only to goods manufactured
outside the United States. It does not apply when the U.S. person owning the
registered mark also owns the mark in the country of manufacture or has a
corporate affiliation with the foreign manufacturer.65 It also does not apply
to registered trademarks owned by foreign persons.66 The narrow scope of
Section 526 arises from its historical purpose: Congress sought to protect
domestic companies that purchase US trademark rights from a foreign man-
ufacturer from the possibility that the foreign manufacturer’s identical
goods—bearing the identical trademark—would find their way into the U.S.
market.67 To benefit from Section 526, however, trademark owners must
make a significant effort to assist the CBP in recognizing unauthorized im-
ports and anticipating their port of entry.68
60. Id. § 133.23(b); see also INTA GUIDE, supra note 5, at 3, 4.
61. 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(b).
62. INTA GUIDE, supra note 5, at 5.
63. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (2012).
64. Under the Lanham Act provisions, Section 526(a), it is “unlawful to import into the
United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise . . . bears a trade-
mark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the
United States,” if the trademark is properly registered, unless the owner of the registration
provides written consent. See Vittoria N. Am. LLC v. Euro-Asia Imports, Inc., 278 F.3d 1076,
1082 (10th Cir. 2001); Ahava (USA), Inc. v. J.W.G., Ltd., 250 F. Supp. 2d 366, 370 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). Section 526(b) subjects such merchandise to seizure and forfeiture. Section 526(c) pro-
vides that any person dealing in such merchandise may be enjoined from doing so or may be
required to export or destroy the merchandise or remove the trademark; and subjects the ven-
dor to liability for the same damages and profits as in an action for trademark infringement.
65. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281, 292-93 (1988); Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc.
v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 664, 673 (3d Cir. 1989); 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(a)(2).
66. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a); 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(a).
67. K Mart Corp., 486 U.S. at 287-88.
68. INTA GUIDE, supra note 5, at 14-19.
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While these provisions give trademark owners powerful tools to prevent
the unauthorized importation and sale of gray market goods, there are still
gaps in protection. Many, though not all, involve goods that are not materi-
ally different from the goods authorized for domestic sale. For example:
1. Domestically made goods intended for foreign sale can be pur-
chased overseas and reimported if they are not materially dif-
ferent from the goods sold under that same trademark in the
United States.69
2. Goods manufactured abroad by the U.S. trademark owner can
be imported if they are not materially different from the goods
sold under that same trademark in the United States.70
3. Goods manufactured abroad by a corporate affiliate of a U.S.
trademark owner can be imported if they are not materially dif-
ferent from the goods sold under that same trademark in the
United States.71
4. Goods manufactured abroad under a license to use an unregis-
tered mark can be imported if the goods are not materially dif-
ferent from the goods sold under that mark in the United
States.72
5. Goods manufactured abroad by a foreign entity that owns the
U.S. trademark can be imported if the goods are not materially
different from the goods authorized for sale in the United
States.73
69. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 138-39
(1998).
70. In Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2004 WL 5794234 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8,
2004), Omega manufactured its Seamaster matches in Switzerland, and distributed them
throughout the world, including the United States. At no point in the litigation did Omega
assert that the watches intended for distribution in the United States were materially different
from those intended for foreign distribution, nor did Omega assert any trademark infringement
claims against the unauthorized importer.
71. K Mart Corp., 486 U.S. at 294 (stating that wholly owned subsidiary of foreign
manufacturer cannot invoke Section 526 of the Tariff Act to prevent third parties from import-
ing the foreign parent company’s trademarked goods); NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810
F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that wholly owned subsidiary of foreign manufacturer
cannot invoke Sections 32 and 43 of the Lanham Act to prevent third party from importing
parent company’s product).
72. See supra notes 29-34, 42-52 and accompanying text. In contrast, if the mark is
federally registered, Section 526 allows the owner of the mark to block the importation of
goods made by a foreign licensee even if they are not materially different. See supra notes 63-
64.
73. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. Neither the foreign owner of a U.S.
trademark, nor its exclusive U.S. licensee, can use Section 526 to block genuine goods manu-
factured abroad even if they were intended exclusively for foreign markets, unless the goods
are materially different from those authorized for sale in the United States.
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6. Goods manufactured abroad can be imported without the do-
mestic trademark owner’s consent even if they are physically
and materially different from domestically authorized goods if
they bear the disclaimer specified in 19 C.F.R. § 133.23.74
B. Copyright Law
Because trademark owners in the United States cannot exclude all paral-
lel imports under trademark law, some have turned to copyright law in an
effort to expand their rights. If a product, its label, or its packaging incorpo-
rates any materials protected by a federal copyright, the owner or exclusive
licensee of the copyright has the exclusive right to import75 and distribute
those materials to the public in the United States.76
It is not difficult to incorporate copyrighted materials into noncopyright-
able goods. In addition to the copyrightable elements in packaging, labels,
tags, instructions, and owner’s manuals, copyrightable designs can be em-
bedded in the products themselves so that the importer or domestic reseller
cannot avoid copyright infringement by simply removing or covering up the
copyrighted tag or label. Copyright may also attach to the shape or overall
appearance of a product, provided that (1) it possesses a minimal degree of
originality,77 and (2) that the artistic element is physically or conceptually
separable from the utilitarian function of the article.78 A candy maker can
therefore assert federal copyright protection for the shape of a candy bar if it
is more original than the ubiquitous rectangle or cylinder shape, and if the
shape does not have an inseparable utilitarian component (such as making
the candy bar easier to hold or to break into pieces). Finally, many consumer
products include copyrighted software. Even if software is not strictly neces-
sary to the functioning of a consumer product, adding even a small software
component will give the trademark owner another method for blocking im-
ports. Complex products such as automobiles, office equipment, computers,
and kitchen appliances will often contain a significant software component
that could be invoked to block unauthorized imports. For example, copy-
74. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) (2012).
76. Id. § 106(3).
77. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Seattle Lighting Fixture Co., 345 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (9th Cir.
2003).
78. Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143 (2d Cir.
1987).
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rightable software is embedded in modern office printers,79 garage door
openers,80 and coffee makers.81
Both the distribution and importation rights are limited by the first sale
rule of Section 109(a), however, under which the copyright owner has the
right to control the first public distribution of a particular copy, but cannot
control subsequent resales of that same copy. Specifically, Section 109(a)
provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title . . . is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or oth-
erwise dispose of that copy or phonorecord.82
1. Case Law Prior to Kirtsaeng
Prior to Kirtsaeng,83 U.S. copyright owners had succeeded in using Sec-
tion 602(a) of federal copyright law84 to block the importation and domestic
resale of copies of their work that were manufactured outside of the United
States.85 Section 602(a) provides, in relevant part:
Importation into the United States, without the authority of the
owner of copyright under this title, of copies . . . of a work that have
been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the
exclusive right to distribute copies . . . under section 106.86
Several courts had held that this language empowered copyright owners
to block importation and domestic sale of foreign-made copies even when
79. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 546 (6th Cir.
2004).
80. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1183 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
81. Salton, Inc. v. Philips Domestic Appliances & Person Care B.V., 391 F.3d 871, 874
(7th Cir. 2004).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012).
83. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a).
85. See BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991) (records); Microsoft Corp.
v. Cietdirect.com LLC, 2008 WL 3162535 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2008) (software); UMG Record-
ings, Inc. v. Norwalk Distribs., Inc., 2003 WL 22722410 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2003) (records);
T.B. Harms Co. v. Jem Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575 (D.N.J. 1987) (records); Hearst Corp.
v. Stark, 639 F. Supp. 970, 976-77 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (books); Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Scorpio
Music Distrib., 569 F. Supp. 47, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (records), aff’d without opinion, 738 F.2d
421 (3d Cir. 1984); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Elcon Indus., 564 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(videogames).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1).
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those copies were made in full compliance with the copyright laws in their
country of manufacture.87
Trademark owners believed that they, too, could take advantage of this
rule in order to block the importation and resale of genuine (that is,
noncounterfeit) goods that cannot be prohibited under federal trademark
law.88 They sought to accomplish this by relying on the copyrightable com-
ponents of their products or packaging in order to restrict the sale of those
goods to foreign markets89—sometimes embedding a copyrightable element
specifically for this purpose.90
The use of copyrights as quasi-trademarks to block parallel imports
gained steam after the Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in Quality King Dis-
tributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc.91 In that case, a California man-
ufacturer of hair care products (L’anza) had sold its products both in the
United States and overseas. L’anza provided advertising and marketing sup-
port to its distributors in the United States, but not overseas. L’anza’s prod-
ucts were priced 35–40% higher in the United States than in foreign
territories. To maintain these higher prices, L’anza authorized its domestic
distributors to sell only within specific territories and only to a limited range
of authorized retailers, such as beauty salons and hair care collages; they
could not sell to drug stores or supermarkets that also carried lower-priced
87. See BMG Music, 952 F.2d at 319 (foreign-made records); UMG Recordings, 2003
WL 22722410 at *4 (records made in Canada); T.B. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1577 (records
made by New Zealand licensee); Hearst, 639 F. Supp. at 972 (books published in the United
Kingdom); Columbia Broad., 569 F. Supp. at 47 (records made by Philippines licensee);
Nintendo, 564 F. Supp. at 940 (videogames produced by Japan licensee).
88. INTA GUIDE, supra note 5, at 20-21 (recommending this strategy).
89. This device met with mixed results, with most courts focusing on where the copy-
righted components were made and first sold. See, e.g., Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L’anza
Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998) (first sale rule permitted reimportation of U.S.-made
hair care products with copyrighted labels); Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d
982, 983 (9th Cir. 2008) (importing Swiss-made watches engraved with copyrighted designs
infringed copyright), aff’d by equally divided court, 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010); Denbicare U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 1996) (foreign-made diapers in copy-
righted packaging could be resold domestically only because copyright owner had authorized
the first sale in the United States ); Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d
477, 479 (9th Cir. 1994) (importing French-made perfume with copyrighted labels infringed
copyright even though it was permissible under Section 526 and the Lanham Act); Sebastian
Int’l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1099 (3d Cir. 1988) (first sale rule
permitted reimportation of U.S.-made hair care products with copyrighted labels); Swatch S.A.
v. New City, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (importing foreign-made watches
with copyrighted designs infringed copyright); Lingo Corp. v. Topix, Inc., 2003 WL 223454
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2003) (expressing doubt whether first sale rule permits importation of trans-
lator devices accompanied by copyrighted product literature and packaging); Summit Tech.
Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instr. Co., 922 F. Supp. 299, 312 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (first sale rule
permitted reimportation of US-made laser system incorporating copyrighted software).
90. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2011 WL 8492716, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
9, 2011).
91. See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 153.
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competing goods.  L’anza’s distributor in the United Kingdom sold a large
quantity of the products to a Malta distributor, however, who then sold them
to a third party that imported them into the United States and sold them to
unauthorized domestic retailers. L’anza sued for copyright infringement, ar-
guing that the importation and sale of the hair care products infringed the
copyright in the labels that were affixed to the products, thus violating
L’anza’s exclusive distribution right under Section 106 and its exclusive im-
portation right under Section 602(a). Quality King argued, however, that the
importation and resale were noninfringing under the first sale rule. The Su-
preme Court agreed, reasoning as follows: Section 602(a) allows the copy-
right owner to block importation not only of pirated copies but also of copies
that were lawfully made in their country of origin.92 The importation right,
however, is merely a special application of the broader public distribution
right of Section 106(3). This conclusion follows from Section 602(a)(1),
which expressly states that unauthorized importation “is an infringement of
the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under Section
106.”93 In addition, the Court believed that, as a practical matter, importation
almost always involves a transfer of ownership:
Strictly speaking, an importer could, of course, carry merchandise
from one country to another without surrendering custody of it. In a
typical commercial transaction, however, the shipper transfers “pos-
session, custody, control and title to the products” to a different per-
son, and L’anza assumes that petitioner’s importation of the L’anza
shipments included such a transfer. An ordinary interpretation of the
statement that a person is entitled “to sell or otherwise dispose of
the possession” of an item surely includes the right to ship it to
another person in another country.94
Because Section 109(a) applies to the distribution right, the Court con-
cluded, it must also apply to the importation right.95 Therefore, if a lawfully
made copy meets the requirements of the first sale rule, then the owner of
that copy is free to import it into the United States and to resell it there.96
Because the labels in question had been lawfully made in the United States,
the first sale rule applied.97 In dicta, however, the Court strongly implied that
the same rule would not apply to foreign-made copies, because these were
“‘lawfully made’ not under the United States Copyright Act, but instead,
92. Id. at 148.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) (2012).
94. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 152.
95. Id. at 145.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 148.
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under the law of some other country.”98 The Court believed that Section
602(a)(1) allowed publishers to protect their domestic markets against unau-
thorized imports.99
Many courts and commentators understood Quality King to preclude ap-
plication of copyright’s first sale rule to goods manufactured outside of the
United States.100 Under this approach, the U.S. copyright owner could pre-
vent importation of copies that were lawfully made overseas, and could also
prevent any subsequent domestic sales of those copies, even after consenting
to their importation. Thus, the purchaser of a lawfully imported foreign-
made copy would infringe copyright simply by selling that copy on the
secondhand market. This interpretation was widely criticized for giving U.S.
copyright owners more control over copies made abroad than over domesti-
cally made copies, thus encouraging them to shift their manufacturing over-
seas in order to prohibit secondhand sales and maintain high prices through
decreased competition.101
98. Id. at 147. The phrase “this title” in Section 109(a) must refer to Title 17 of the U.S.
Code, which is where Section 109(a) and the rest of the federal copyright laws are codified.
99. Even in the absence of a market allocation agreement between, for example, a
publisher of the United States edition and a publisher of the British edition of the
same work, each such publisher could make lawful copies. If the author of the work
gave the exclusive United States distribution rights—enforceable under the Act—to
the publisher of the United States edition and the exclusive British distribution
rights to the publisher of the British edition, however, presumably only those made
by the publisher of the United States edition would be “lawfully made under this
title” within the meaning of § 109(a). The first sale doctrine would not provide the
publisher of the British edition who decided to sell in the American market with a
defense to an action under § 602(a) (or, for that matter, to an action under § 106(3),
if there was a distribution of the copies).
Id. at 148 (footnotes omitted).
The Court bolstered this conclusion by noting that the Register of Copyrights’ 1961 Re-
port to Congress had suggested extending the import ban to nonpirated copies in order to help
publishers protect their exclusive domestic distribution rights:
When arrangements are made for both a U.S. edition and a foreign edition of the
same work, the publishers frequently agree to divide the international markets. The
foreign publisher agrees not to sell his edition in the United States, and the U.S.
publisher agrees not to sell his edition in certain foreign countries. It has been sug-
gested that the import ban on piratical copies should be extended to bar the importa-
tion of the foreign edition in contravention of such an agreement.
Quality King, 523 U.S. at 147 (quoting Copyright Law Revision: Report of the Register
of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 125-
126 (H.R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1961)).
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence appeared to agree with the majority’s dicta: “I join the
Court’s opinion recognizing that we do not today resolve cases in which the allegedly infring-
ing imports were manufactured abroad.” Id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
100. See, e.g., Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 988-90 (9th Cir.
2008); Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Kumar, 721 F. Supp. 2d 166, 176-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
101. See Denbicare U.S.A., Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1149-50 (9th Cir.
1996).
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In a heroic effort—which was ultimately doomed—the Ninth Circuit
responded to this concern by modifying the rule derived from Quality King.
In Denbicare U.S.A., Inc. v. Toys R Us, Inc.,102 the Ninth Circuit held that
once a U.S. copyright owner has consented to the first domestic sale of its
foreign-made copies, the first sale rule permits subsequent resales of those
copies.103 While this interpretation would still permit domestic copyright
owners to control imports of foreign-made copies, it would not enable them
to abolish the secondhand domestic market for those copies. Thus, it would
not give copyright owners an incentive to shift their manufacturing overseas.
While this gloss on the rule of Quality King served the public interest far
better than the broader prohibition applied by other courts, the language of
the copyright statutes did not support it,104 and no other circuit adopted it.
Capitalizing on Quality King, watchmaker Omega applied a copyrighted
globe design to the back of its Swiss made Seamaster watches in order to
prevent their unauthorized importation and domestic resale. Omega began
using this copyrighted design on the advice of its legal department, and
under pressure from its authorized retailers, for the specific purpose of
blocking parallel imports.105 In Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A.,106
an evenly divided Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
favor of Omega.107
102. Id. at 1150.
103. The Denbicare court derived this rule from language in its previous decision in
Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 482 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994). The
defendant in that case asked the Ninth Circuit to hold that the first sale rule applied to lawfully
made foreign copies, and to overturn its contrary precedent, BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d
318 (9th Cir. 1991). The Parfums Givenchy court declined to do so. 38 F.3d at 482. In what is
arguably dicta, the court noted that foreign made copies should be covered by the first sale rule
once the U.S. copyright owner had authorized their domestic sale, but that these circumstances
were not present in the case at hand. Id. at 481, 482 n.8. The Ninth Circuit adopted this rule on
public policy grounds, to avoid giving copyright owners more control over their foreign-made
copies than over their domestically-made copies, a discrepancy which would give them an
incentive to manufacture their goods overseas. Id. at 482 n.8.
104. Specifically, nothing in the language of Sections 106(3), 602(a), or 109(a) supports
drawing a distinction between imported copies first sold domestically with the copyright
owner’s consent and those first sold domestically without such consent. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 106(3), 602(a), 109(a) (2012).
105. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2011 WL 8492716, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
9, 2011).
106. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (per curiam) (aff’g
Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008)) (Justice Kagan was
recused).
107. Costco, 541 F.3d at 990. Because the copyright owner had not consented to the sale
of these specific watches in the United States, the Ninth Circuit did not have occasion to apply
the unique gloss on the first sale rule that it developed in Parfums Givenchy and Denbicare.
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2. Kirtsaeng
The Court finally resolved the application of the first sale rule to for-
eign-made copies in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.108 The petitioner
in Kirtsaeng imported and sold copyrighted books that had been manufac-
tured outside the United States with the publisher’s consent. The publisher
initially prevailed in its infringement suit, because both the district court and
the Second Circuit held that the first sale rule did not apply to copies manu-
factured outside of the United States.109
The Supreme Court reversed, holding by a vote of 6–3 that the first sale
of a lawfully made copy of a work exhausts the copyright owner’s exclusive
importation and distribution rights with respect to that copy, regardless of
where the copy was made. The Court relied in part on Quality King’s hold-
ing that, because the Section 602 importation right is subsumed within the
Section 106(3) public distribution right, the first sale rule applies to importa-
tion as well as public distribution. It also, however, repudiated as “pure dic-
tum” Quality King’s statement that the first sale rule did not apply to
lawfully made foreign copies. Although Section 109(a), by its own terms,
applies only to copies “lawfully made under this title,” the Kirtsaeng Court
concluded that Congress did not intend this phrase to exclude lawful copies
made outside the United States. It based this conclusion on the language and
legislative history of Section 109, the common law origins of the first sale
rule, and public policy considerations.
a. Statutory Language
Parsing the phrase “lawfully made under this title” word by word, the
majority was unconvinced that “under” implies any geographic limita-
tions.110 The Court noted that the same phrase also appears in other Title 17
provisions where a geographic interpretation would be highly problematic.111
These include the public display right under Section 109(c), the right to pub-
licly perform or display arcade games under Section 109(e), and the right to
show audiovisual works during classroom instruction under Section 110(1).
The Court added that a similar phrase appears in Section 106, which de-
scribes the rights of the “owner of copyright under this title.”112 The Court
108. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355-56 (2013).
109. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 654 F.3d 210, 216 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d,
133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). The Second Circuit went on to apply its Kirtsaeng decision in Pearson
Education, Inc. v. Kumar, 721 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, sub nom. Pearson
Education, Inc. v. Yadav, 452 F. App’x. 11 (2d Cir. 2011), pet. for cert. filed, No. 11-1343
(May 3, 2012). The district court in Pearson held that the first sale rule did not apply to
foreign-made copies that were imported and then sold to U.S. purchasers through the Internet,
and the Second Circuit affirmed on the strength of its own decision in Kirtsaeng.
110. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1358.
111. Id. at 1362.
112. Id.
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flatly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s gloss on Section 109 in Denbicare—which
held that the first sale rule applies to foreign-made copies only after the first
authorized sale in the United States—because nothing in the statutory lan-
guage supports that interpretation.113
The Court’s arguments are not equally persuasive. With respect to the
right to publicly perform or display arcade games under Section 109(e), and
the right to perform audiovisual works in the classroom under Section
110(1), Congress might indeed have intended to limit these privileges to
uses that involve domestically made copies. The copies used in these situa-
tions are always “copies” in the dictionary sense—they are not the original
fixation of the works. Therefore, in these contexts a geographic interpreta-
tion of “lawfully made under this title” does not produce an absurd result—
only a protectionist one.
The Court’s Section 106 argument is even less persuasive. The phrase at
issue in Section 109—”lawfully made under this title”—is completely dif-
ferent from the phrase used in Section 106—”the owner of copyright under
this title.” The latter does not concern itself with the lawfulness of a tangible
copy, but with standing to sue for infringement. Only the owner of the U.S.
copyright in a work has the right to enforce the exclusive rights enumerated
in Section 106; thus, even if a person is considered the owner of a work
under foreign law, if that person’s ownership claim is not also recognized
“under” federal copyright law, then the person has no standing to sue under
Section 106.114 Therefore, contrary to the Court’s analysis, giving a geo-
graphic meaning to “lawfully made under this title” has no impact whatso-
ever on the meaning of Section 106.
In contrast, Section 109(c) provides by far the strongest argument for a
nongeographic interpretation of “under this title.” Section 109(c) allows the
owner of a copy “lawfully made under this title” to display that copy to
members of the public who are present in the same location as the copy (thus
allowing artwork to be displayed in a museum or gallery, but not over the
Internet or on television, for example).115 As the Court noted, it is highly
113. Id. at 1360.
114. See, e.g., Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82,91
(2d Cir. 1998) (under choice of law principles, Russian law determined ownership of U.S.
copyrights with respect to works created in Russia, and U.S. law determined the owner’s
standing to sue under Section 106); Films by Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 341 F. Supp. 2d 199
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (refusing to give effect to Russian Federation’s claim to own, by expropria-
tion, U.S. distribution rights to a film). Exclusive licensees and certain joint authors also have
enforceable rights under Section 106, regardless of whether they have those same rights in
foreign countries. See BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1991).
115. 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012) (permitting display to “viewers present at the place where
the copy is located”); see Bryant v. Gordon, 483 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (Section
109(c) does not permit display on the Internet); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home
Ent’t, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 334-35 (D.N.J. 2002) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79
(1976) (§ 109(c) does not allow “transmitt[ing] . . . by any method (by closed or open circuit
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unlikely that Congress intended to prevent people who purchase foreign-
made artwork from displaying that artwork in the United States.116
The real culprit here may be Congress’s use of the word copy through-
out the Copyright Act to include not only reproductions but also the original
fixation of the artwork.117 Because the copyright statutes define “copy” to
include the original fixation of a work as well as all subsequent reproduc-
tions of it, reading a geographic limitation into Section 109(c) would mean
that the owner of an original work of art created outside the United States
could not display that piece of art in a museum or other public place without
the consent of the copyright owner. It is possible that Congress intended
Section 106(5) to grant copyright owners the exclusive right to control pub-
lic displays only of reproductions of their works, thus allowing purchasers
of the originals an unfettered right to display their copies without even
resorting to the first sale rule. Alternatively, Congress may have meant Sec-
tion 109(c) as a first sale privilege for purchasers of original fixations and
domestically made reproductions of such works, but not foreign
reproductions.
The use of the word copy to encompass originals also afflicts Section
602(a)(1): one who purchases original works of art outside the United States
should be able to import and resell the originals without running afoul of the
copyright owner’s exclusive importation and distribution rights. Based on
the Court’s analysis, the way to make sense of Sections 602(a) and 106(3) in
this context is to treat these foreign-made originals as copies made “under
this title” for purposes of Section 109(a). But the problem can be solved just
as easily by specifying that original fixations are not copies for purposes of
Sections 602(a)(1), 106(3), or 109(a). Although Congress did not take that
route, arguably this was simply a drafting error—the same one that afflicts
Sections 106(5) and 109(c). This makes the majority’s statutory interpreta-
tion argument less compelling.
b. Legislative History
The wording of the first sale rule in the Copyright Act of 1909 did not
imply any geographical restriction:
[N]othing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict
the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of
which has been lawfully obtained.118
television, for example, or by a computer system)”); Brown v. McCormick, 23 F. Supp. 2d
594, 609 (D. Md. 1998) (Section 109(c) does not allow display on television broadcast).
116. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1362.
117. The Copyright Act defines “copies” as “material objects . . . in which a work is
fixed,” and adds: “The term ‘copies’ includes the material object . . . in which the work is first
fixed.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
118. Copyright Act of 1909, § 41, 35 Stat. 1084.
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Although the 1976 Act changed the rule by making it applicable only to
the “owner” of a copy “lawfully made under this title,” the Kirtsaeng major-
ity found no indication in the legislative history that Congress intended the
1976 provision to apply only to domestically made copies.119 In the Court’s
view, Congress adopted the new language simply to make clear that the rule
applied (1) only to nonpirated copies, and (2) only to owners of copies rather
than to all lawful possessors of copies, such as movie theaters that leased
their motion picture prints.120
The 1976 Act also phased out the manufacturing clause (former Section
601), which had prohibited the importation of copies made outside of the
United States and Canada; the Court cited this as further evidence that Con-
gress did not intend Section 109 to discriminate against lawfully made for-
eign copies.121 The manufacturing clause had a very different purpose from
Section 602, however. Its purpose was to protect the U.S. printing industry
by preventing American authors from outsourcing the printing of their En-
glish-language works to lower-priced foreign manufacturers.122 Thus, for-
eign-made copies of English-language works could not be imported even
with the consent of the authors, and authors that imported copies in violation
of the rule forfeited their copyrights. Thus, Section 601 restricted the rights
of authors, and repealing it enhanced their rights. Section 602, in contrast,
enhanced the rights of authors by allowing them to control importation of
their works; Kirtsaeng’s narrow interpretation of Section 602 restricts au-
thors’ rights. The fact that Congress in 1976 chose to allow authors to im-
port copies of their works in no way suggests that Congress also sought to
allow everyone else to import copies without the authors’ consent.
Finally, the Court acknowledged that, during the 1960s, when the draft-
ing of 1976 Act was in its early stages, the Register of Copyrights presented
several proposals to prohibit the importation of lawful foreign-made copies,
in an attempt to alleviate publishers’ concerns over “the difficulty of divid-
ing international markets.”123 None of these proposals expressly considered
the impact of the first sale rule, however, even though the Authors’ League
raised the issue.124 Because the 1960s draft provision did not address the
applicability of the first sale rule, and was abandoned in favor of the current
language, the Court found this part of the legislative history
unenlightening.125
119. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1360-62.
120. Id. at 1360-61.
121. Id.
122. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 164-66 (1976).
123. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1369.
124. Id. at 1369-70.
125. Id.
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c. Common Law History
Applying a familiar canon of statutory construction, the majority rea-
soned that Section 109 should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
first sale rule as it existed at common law prior to codification.126 In the
seventeenth century, the common law did not permit restrictions on the
alienation of chattels.127 Such restrictions, the Court observed, would be dif-
ficult to enforce as applied to “difficult-to-trace, readily moveable goods.”128
Before the first sale rule was codified in the 1909 Act, the Court had applied
the common law principle in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,129 where it refused
to enforce resale restrictions contained in a notice printed in a book. The
Kirtsaeng Court saw no hint of a geographical limitation in the history of the
common law rule.130 This is hardly surprising, however, because neither
Bobbs-Merrill nor the other common law authorities cited by the Court in-
volved imported goods. Therefore, there was no occasion for the courts to
consider whether the same rule should apply to imported copies of copy-
righted works. Nonetheless, the majority treated the absence of such evi-
dence as further support for applying the first sale rule to foreign-made
copies.
d. Public Policy
Although it focused much of its analysis on the statutory language and
history of the first sale rule, the Court also emphasized the potential down-
stream effects of a contrary holding. If the first sale rule did not apply to
foreign-made copies, the Court observed, then used bookstores, libraries,
and others who sell or lend copyrighted materials would face the impossible
task of identifying which of their volumes were foreign-made, and then
tracking down all of those copyright owners for permission to distribute
those copies.131 This onerous burden would effectively shut down their
operations.
Additionally, foreign-made consumer goods containing software, such
as cell phones, automobiles, and computers, or accompanied by copyrighted
labels, instructions, or packaging materials, would require the copyright
owner’s consent for any domestic resale, even if they were manufactured,
imported, and initially sold with the copyright owner’s consent. Art muse-
ums, galleries, and other public venues could not publicly display foreign-
made copyrighted works of art without obtaining copyright permission be-
cause Section 109(c) would not apply.
126. Id. at 1363.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 339 (1908).
130. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1363-64.
131. Id. at 1364-65.
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Not mentioned by the Court, but also problematic, would be the impact
on the fine art market if the lawful owner of a foreign-made copyrighted
painting or sculpture could not import or resell the original without the con-
sent of the artist or the artist’s heirs. Alternatively, one can view the problem
of original artwork through a different lens altogether—as a problem that
arises from careless drafting. Even if this particular concern is set aside,
however, allowing copyright owners to control all public displays and distri-
butions of foreign-made copies would have serious consequences.
3. What is Left of Section 602(a)(1)?
Very little remains of Section 602(a)(1) after Kirtsaeng. According to
the majority, the importation ban still applies to lawfully made foreign cop-
ies, but only with respect to an exceedingly narrow range of unauthorized
importation activities:132 (1) copies made overseas (by a foreign publisher or
printer) with the consent of the U.S. copyright owner and then imported
before any sale takes place; (2) copies made overseas with the consent of the
U.S. copyright owner and then delivered but not sold to a wholesaler that
subsequently imports them; and (3) copies imported by a licensee (such as a
film distributor that leases its prints), consignee or bailee.133
It is unlikely that Congress intended Section 602(a)(1) to have so little
application. As Justice Ginsburg notes in her dissent, if Congress had meant
to apply the importation ban only to copies that have never been sold, Con-
gress would not have created the exceptions in Section 602(a)(3) that ex-
pressly permit importation of copies for certain personal, governmental, or
archival purposes, including library lending.134
Because of the Court’s narrowing of the importation ban, only rarely
will copyright owners be able to use incidental copyrights to block parallel
imports. They can, however, accomplish this by structuring their foreign
132. Justice Kagan’s concurrence describes this as “a fairly esoteric set of applications.”
Id. at 1372. She also suggests that Quality King erred in holding that Section 109(a) limits the
importation right. Id. at 1373.
133. Id. at 1368. The third scenario will apply only where the copies possessed by the
licensee, consignee, or bailee have not already been the subjects of a first sale, which would
seem to be a rare occurrence. It might apply, however, where a domestic publisher outsources
its manufacturing activities but does not allow the foreign manufacturer to own the copies.
134. Id. at 1379. Justice Ginsburg would have held that (1) Section 109(a) applies only to
domestically-made copies, but (2) under the common law exhaustion rule recognized in
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908), which predates Congress’s codification of
the first sale doctrine, an authorized domestic distribution of foreign-made copies exhausts the
copyright owner’s distribution rights with respect to those copies, without any need to invoke
Section 109(a). Accordingly, if a copyright owner authorizes only a foreign distribution of its
foreign-made copies, exhaustion does not apply. Id. at 1386-87 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Her
effort, however, to refute what she called the majority’s “parade of horribles,” id. at 1373,
depended on a combination of doctrines—implied license, fair use, and Section 602(a)(3)(C)’s
limited importation right for libraries, id. at 1388-89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)—which offer
little reassurance to libraries, consumers, book dealers, retailers, or museums.
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manufacturing activities to fit within the confines of the newly narrowed
Section 602(a)(1)—by authorizing foreign manufacturers to make the copy-
rightable components of their merchandise without allowing those manufac-
turers to actually own the copies they make. Because the manufacturers will
be mere possessors but not owners, they will have no authority to sell the
copies or export them to the United States. If those copies do find their way
to the United States, the first sale rule will not apply, and both the importer
and any subsequent domestic distributors will be liable for infringement.
This situation would arise, for example, if the foreign manufacturer makes
more copies than the U.S. owner chooses to import at any given time. If the
foreign manufacturer were to ship those copies to the United States, this
would infringe under Section 602 (in addition to probably being a breach of
contract). This is a very limited scenario, however, which requires the copy-
right owner to forego all foreign sales. In a more typical scenario, where the
copyright owner sells (or consigns) some of these copies to a foreign distrib-
utor to be sold in foreign markets, then under Kirtsaeng the copyright owner
will lose control over further distribution, including importation and sale in
the United States. Thus, any authorized sale in a foreign market will trigger
the first sale rule.
4. How Will Congress Respond to Kirtsaeng?
Kirtsaeng’s regime of international copyright exhaustion may be short-
lived. Because the Court based its holding on statutory interpretation rather
than constitutional imperatives, Congress can overturn the decision simply
by amending the statute. The influential copyright-intensive industries in the
United States (book publishing, software, motion pictures, sound recordings,
and video games) are likely to lobby for restoration of the importation ban.
Now that trademark owners have discovered the utility of copyright law in
blocking parallel imports, they are likely to join the lobbying effort as well.
The Obama administration will probably support a parallel importation
ban for copyrighted works. Failure to do so will be a dramatic reversal of the
policy for which the United States has consistently advocated in the interna-
tional arena.  The United States has pressured other countries to prohibit
parallel imports of copyrighted works, sometimes threatening or imposing
the “Special 301 Watch List” designation as a penalty for noncompliance.135
It will be ironic if the United States itself abandons the very policy which it
has pressured other countries to adopt.
More recently, the United States has raised the stakes by seeking to in-
clude a parallel importation ban in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPP). The TPP, a multinational agreement covering a wide array of trade-
135. See Hawin, supra note 12, at 79, 82, 84, 115 (noting that, with varying degrees of
success, the United States has exerted such pressure on Hong Kong, Taiwan, Israel, South
Africa, Peru, Venezuala, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand).
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related issues, is currently being negotiated by the United States and eleven
other countries.136 Although the negotiations are secret,137 two working
drafts of the intellectual property provisions have been leaked.138  In each
draft, the United States has endorsed a provision that would require mem-
bers to ban parallel imports of copyrighted works:
Each Party shall provide to authors, performers, and producers of
phonograms the right to authorize or prohibit the importation into
that Party’s territory of copies of the work, performance, or phono-
gram made without authorization, or made outside that Party’s ter-
ritory with the authorization of the author, performer, or producer
of the phonogram.139
136. The other countries are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico,
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. See Update on the 17th Round of Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement (TPP) Negotiations, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partner-
ship/round-17-peru (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). Although the negotiations are expected to con-
clude in 2013, see The United States in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/
2011/november/united-states-trans-pacific-partnership (last visited Oct. 14, 2013), as this arti-
cle goes to press it seems doubtful that this deadline will be met.
137. See Letter from 130 Members of Congress to USTR Expressing Concern over
Transparency in TPP (June 27, 2012), available at http://publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20
Letter%20FINAL.pdf; Sean Flynn, Law Professors Call for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
Transparency, PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP. (May 9, 2012), available at http://
infojustice.org/archives/21137 (reproducing protest letter from law professors to USTR as well
as USTR response); Letter to President Obama, Members of Congress, and Ambassador
Michael Froman (Nov.14, 2013), available at http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/
11/Law-Professors-TPP-11142013.pdf (letter from law professors asking Obama Administra-
tion to release current official draft of TPP).
138. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (Draft Aug. 30, 2013), available at http://
keionline.org/sites/default/files/Wikileaks-secret-TPP-treaty-IP-chapter.pdf [hereinafter TPP
2013 Draft]; Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (Draft Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://
keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf [hereinafter TPP 2011
Draft].
139. TPP 2013 Draft, art. QQ.G.3, supra note 138, at 50; TPP 2011 Draft, art. 4.2, supra
note 138, at 12. In each draft, a footnote authorizes exceptions to the general rule. See infra
note 369. Annotations in the 2013 draft, however, indicate that the United States is the only
TPP country that still endorses the ban on parallel imports of copyrighted works. Furthermore,
the 2013 draft also contains a contradictory provision, endorsed by eight countries, but op-
posed by the United States and Australia, which affirmatively favors international exhaustion,
TPP 2013 Draft, art. QQ.G.17, supra note 138, at 65 (“The Parties are encouraged to establish
international exhaustion of rights.“). It also contains a separate proposal from Canada that
would allow each signatory to choose its own exhaustion rule, thus effectively making the TPP
neutral on the question of international exhaustion. Id. (“Nothing in this Chapter shall affect
the freedom of the Parties to determine whether and under what conditions the exhaustion of
copyright and related rights applies.”).
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The United States is one of the strongest backers of the TPP, and has
already included similar provisions in two current free trade agreements.140
In each case, the provision expressly applies to authorized copies, and makes
no mention of the concept of exhaustion or any other exception to the impor-
tation right. Thus, the United States has already committed itself to two
agreements that are inconsistent with Kirtsaeng.  The United States has al-
ready met significant resistance in its efforts to include a parallel import ban
in the TPP.141 Post-Kirtsaeng, it will likely encounter even greater difficulty
persuading other countries to adopt or retain import restrictions that it has
itself rejected.
Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion in Kirtsaeng, in which Justice Alito
joined, suggests one way in which Congress might restore the importation
ban without triggering the parade of horribles that concerned the Kirtsaeng
majority—by amending Section 602(a) to clarify that, unlike the exclusive
distribution right, the importation ban is not limited by the first sale rule.142
This would allow copyright owners to pursue infringement claims against
unauthorized importers, but not against purchasers who subsequently sell or
lend those imported copies within the United States.
In April 2013 the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee an-
nounced the Committee’s intent to conduct “a comprehensive review of U.S.
copyright laws.”143 This review may include a proposal to restore the exclu-
sive importation right. If that effort succeeds, then trademark owners will
continue to add copyrightable features to their foreign-made products and
packaging for the primary purpose of controlling parallel imports.
Even if Kirtsaeng is not legislatively overturned, copyright owners may
be able to exploit an ambiguity in the opinion. The Court focused its analysis
entirely on the question of whether the first sale rule was limited by the
place of manufacture; it did not address the equally important question
whether the first sale rule applies to copies that are made and sold under the
authority of a copyright owner other than the U.S. copyright owner. In Kirt-
saeng, the American publisher Wiley had established a wholly owned for-
eign subsidiary, John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte. Ltd. “to publish, print and
140. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, art. 4(11), Oct. 24, 2000, 41
I.L.M. 63 [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement]; U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agree-
ment, U.S.-Morocco, art. 15.5(2), June 15, 2004, 118 Stat. 1103.
141. See supra note 139. A new “Negotiator’s Note” attached to Article QQ.G.3 in the
2013 draft suggests that the United States may be waivering: “The US is considering the
relationship between this provision and other proposals regarding the exhaustion of IP rights,
as well as other TPP countries’ legal regimes.” TPP 2013 Draft, supra note 138, at 50 n.136.
142. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1372-73 (2013) (Kagan, E.,
concurring).
143. Press Release, United States House of Representatives, Chairman Goodlatte An-
nounces Comprehensive Review of Copyright Law (Apr. 24, 2013) available at http://judici-
ary.house.gov/news/2013/04242013_2.html.
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sell Wiley’s English language textbooks abroad.”144 When the opinion states
that the foreign-made copies had been “manufactured and sold with Wiley’s
permission,”145 it implicitly conflates these two separate legal entities. Al-
though this is consistent with the analysis of parallel imports under the Lan-
ham Act,146 the Court does not explain why it chose the same approach for
copyrights.
With respect to copyrights, if the foreign entity were not wholly owned
and controlled by the U.S. parent, would it still be correct to say that the
parent consented to the foreign publication? As discussed in Part II below,
copyright owners in Canada147 and South Africa148 have avoided exhaustion
of their rights by splitting their domestic and foreign copyrights among dif-
ferent assignees. Employing a similar strategy in the United States might
avoid the international exhaustion rule imposed by Kirtsaeng.
For example, if John Wiley & Sons had assigned its foreign copyrights
to a different (and perhaps completely unrelated) legal entity, it could argue
that it never consented to the foreign manufacture or sale of the textbooks
that Kirtsaeng imported. Although the copies could still be described as law-
fully made, the first sale rule might not apply, because the U.S. copyright
owner did not itself introduce them into the stream of commerce. Owners of
valuable copyrights in works such as books and software might be reluctant
to assign rather than license their rights to foreign publishers. Copyrights in
labels, packaging, and other minor accessories, however, tend to have a
much lower value, making the decision to assign rather than license them
less problematic. Therefore, the divided-copyright approach might be espe-
cially useful for the kinds of incidental copyrights that allow trademark own-
ers to broaden their protection against parallel imports.
C. Patent Law
In addition to copyright law, trademark owners in some cases may have
recourse to patent law to obtain relief against unauthorized imports. The
owner of a U.S. patent can prohibit the unauthorized importation or domestic
sale of merchandise embodying the patented invention.149 This rule applies
to both utility patents and design patents.150 While utility patents apply to
useful products and processes,151 design patents apply to ornamental designs
that are used to decorate articles of manufacture.152  A single logo—such as
144. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1356.
145. Id.
146. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 278-279 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 257-258 and accompanying text.
149. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
150. Id. (referring to “any patented invention”).
151. Id. § 101 (authorizing patents for “useful” inventions).
152. Id. § 171.
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the globe design engraved on the back of Omega’s Seamaster watches153—
can potentially qualify for trademark, copyright, and design patent protec-
tion simultaneously.
While owners of domestic utility patents can use those patents to block
unauthorized imports of articles embodying their patented inventions, utility
patents are not an option for most trademark owners seeking an alternative
to trademark law in preventing parallel imports. To be patentable, an inven-
tion must meet stringent standards of novelty154 and must perform some use-
ful function.155 In addition, the applicant must apply for the patent in a
timely manner.156 Moreover, obtaining utility patents is a time-consuming
and costly process.157 For these reasons, utility patents will rarely provide a
convenient end run around trademark law as a method of blocking parallel
imports.158
For most trademark owners, design patents are a more practical option
for blocking parallel imports. Because design patents protect novel ornamen-
tal designs applied to manufactured goods,159 many features of product con-
figuration and packaging will qualify for protection. Although design patents
cannot protect word marks or textual elements such as instruction manuals,
they can protect nonverbal features such as surface ornamentation or the
decorative shape of a manufactured article, provided these are decorative
rather than utilitarian. Like copyrightable material, a patentable design can
be incorporated into the packaging of a product or embedded in the product
itself. For example, Omega’s globe design would be subject matter eligible
for a design patent. The shape of the watch itself would also be eligible. The
design for which the patent is obtained may also serve as a trademark if it
functions as a source indicator; if not, it may simply be an ornamental design
that makes the product more appealing to purchasers.160 In either case, the
153. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
154. Id. §§ 101, 102.
155. Id. § 101.
156. Id. § 102.
157. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1498 (2001) (estimating the cost at $10,000 to $30,000); Elizabeth Herbst Schierman, IP
Transactions: Questions to Ask Before Buying Patent-Related Rights, 55 ADVOC. 20, 24 n.2
(Oct. 2012) (noting that cost of prosecuting patent “may easily reach $25,000 or more”).
158. Certain kinds of merchandise can easily include a patentable software component,
such as computers, automobiles, office equipment, consumer electronics and appliances. If the
software is only a minor component of the product, however, the cost and difficulty of ob-
taining patent protection would make this strategy impractical. In contrast, obtaining copyright
protection for software is automatic and inexpensive.
159. 35 U.S.C. § 171; Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1871) (noting
that the purpose of design patents is to encourage manufacturers to make utilitarian articles
more attractive).
160. Copyright and trademark laws may also protect patented designs. See Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000); Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v.
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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owner of the design patent can bring a patent infringement claim161 to block
what would otherwise be lawful importation under trademark or copyright
laws. Although the concept of exhaustion applies to patents as well as copy-
rights,162 thus far the federal courts have held that exhaustion does not limit
the right of a patent owner to block parallel imports.163
Compared to copyright protection, design patent protection is more ex-
pensive to obtain,164 requires novelty and nonobviousness rather than mere
originality,165 involves a lengthy application process,166 and offers a much
shorter term of protection.167 Because designs that have already been in use
for a year or more are ineligible for patent protection,168 trademark owners
seeking to use design patent protection against parallel imports will have to
develop new designs if they have not already patented their existing designs,
and they will have to periodically refresh those designs and submit new ap-
plications. Thus, while copyright law prior to Kirtsaeng provided a more
convenient and economical end run around trademark law limitations, as
161. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
162. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (noting that in
patent law, the Supreme Court has long recognized the exhaustion doctrine. It has, however,
never been codified).
163. Ninestar Tech. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 667 F.3d 1373 , 1378-79 (Fed. Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1656 (Mar. 25, 2013); Fujifilm Corp. v. Benun, 605 F.3d 1366,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed.
Cir. 2001). But see Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple, 2012 WL 6863471 at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov.
9, 2012) (distinguishing Ninestar as involving direct foreign sales by patentee, and holding
that exhaustion did not apply to goods sold abroad by licensee pursuant to unconditional
worldwide license from patentee).
164. The cost of obtaining a design patent is typically $2,500 to $3,000. See Jeff John
Roberts, Here Come the Design Patents: New Law Boosts Rights in Shapes, Designs, GIGAOM
(Dec. 27, 2012, 7:38 AM), http://gigaom.com/2012/12/27/here-come-the-design-patents-new-
law-boosts-rights-in-shapes-designs/; see also Travis L. Manfredi, Sans Protection: Typeface
Design and Copyright in the Twenty-First Century, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 841, 862 (2011)(noting
high cost of design patents compared to copyright protection). The only cost of copyright
protection is the one-time registration fee (currently $35 to $65); registration is optional but
confers significant benefits, including the right to sue for infringement.
165. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (noting that, with some exceptions, the general requirements of
patent law apply equally to design patents). The novelty and nonobviousness requirements
require the design to be significantly different from pre-existing designs. Id. § 102 (novelty);
id. § 103 (nonobviousness).
166. They are, however, significantly easier to obtain, and less costly, than utility patents.
See Perry J. Saidman, The Crisis in the Law of Designs, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
301, 332 (2007) (comparing cost of design and utility patents).
167. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (currently, design patents have a 14-year term); Patent Law Trea-
ties Implementation Act of 2012, Pub L. No. 112-211, 126 Stat. 1527 (for applications filed on
or after December 18, 2013, the term will be extended to 15 years); 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), (c)
(noting that under the Copyright Act of 1976, the term of protection is the life of the author
plus 70 years or, for works made for hire and certain other works, the lesser of 95 years from
publication or 120 years from creation).
168. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).
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long as Kirtsaeng remains the law, some trademark owners may turn to de-
sign patents as an alternative.
Recent developments in design patent law have increased the likelihood
that trademark owners will adopt this strategy.  A series of court decisions
has made it easier for design patent owners to win infringement suits.169  In
the Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act,170 which takes effect on De-
cember 18, 2013, Congress made design patents more attractive and cost-
effective.  The new law permits design patent applicants (1) to file a single
international application to seek design patents in multiple countries, (2) to
include up to 100 designs in a single international application, and (3) to
recover damages for infringements that occurred while the patent application
was still pending.171 The law also increases the term of design patent protec-
tion from fourteen to fifteen years.172
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BARRIERS TO PARALLEL IMPORTS UNDER
FOREIGN LAWS
The United States is not alone in wrestling with the questions of
whether, how, and to what extent intellectual property laws should be used
to limit parallel imports. While many countries permit a wide range of paral-
lel imports, most impose at least some restrictions.173
169. Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (under ordinary
observer test, court must consider “overall effect” of patented design, rather than a detailed
verbal description); Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en
banc) (eliminating “point of novelty” test for infringement, and holding that the sole test is
whether ordinary observer would believe designs were the same). Apple’s successful infringe-
ment suit against Samsung, see Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 11-CV-01846
(N.D. Cal. 2012), which resulted from Apple’s aggressive design patent strategy, see Christo-
pher Carani, Apple v. Samsung: Design Patents Take Center Stage, 5 LANDSLIDE (Jan./Feb.
2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/landslide/2012_13/january_feb-
ruary/apple_v_samsung_design_patents_take_center_stage.html (noting dramatic increase in
Apple’s design patent applications from 2006 to 2007), will prompt many businesses to in-
crease their use of design patents.
170. Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-211, 126 Stat.
1532 (signed into law December 19, 2012).
171. See Vera Suarez & Alan N. Herda, The Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of
2012, LEXOLOGY (June 4, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ea3bf090-
7fc1-471e-8e79-d0d95dd111e6 (describing these provisions).
172. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (currently, design patents have a 14-year term); Patent Law Trea-
ties Implentation Act of 2012, Pub L. No. 112-211, 126 Stat. 1527 (for applications filed on or
after December 18, 2013, the term will be extended to 15 years).
173. Singapore has lifted nearly all restrictions on parallel imports of lawfully-made
copyrighted goods. See infra notes 239-241 and accompanying text. Taiwan permits parallel
imports of patented inventions and trademarked goods, but treats unauthorized importation of
copyrighted works as infringement. Yuan-Chen (Jessica) Chiang, Parallel Importation of Cop-
yright Products in Taiwan: A Struggle with International Trade Policy, 13 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 744 (2010). Canada’s trademark law permits parallel imports, but its copyright laws are
stricter. See infra notes 270-274 and accompanying text.
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The European Union (EU) prohibits members from restricting imports
from other countries in the European Economic Area (EEA), but requires
them to block parallel imports from outside the EEA.174 EU members are
therefore prohibited from adopting a policy of international exhaustion with
respect to goods that are first sold outside the EEA.175 This rule applies to
trademarks,176 copyrights,177 and design rights (which are similar to design
patents).178 With respect to patents, exhaustion applies within the European
Union,179 but the question of international exhaustion is left to individual EU
members.180 Because the European Union has harmonized the parallel im-
portation rules governing the different intellectual property regimes to such a
great extent, the problem of trademark owners using copyright or design
patents as an end run around trademark law has not arisen.181
174. Preventing Parallel Imports Under Trademark Law, LADAS & PERRY LLP, http://
www.ladas.com/IPProperty/GrayMarket/GrayMa02.html (last visited July 14, 2013).
175. Council Regulation 40/94, art. 31(1), 1993 O.J. (L 11) 1 (EC) (applying same ex-
haustion rule to Community trade marks); First Council Directive 89/104/EEC, to Approxi-
mate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks , 1988 O.J. (L 40) 1, 7 (requiring
EU members to adopt rule of regional exhaustion); Case C-355/96, Silhouette Int’l Schmied v.
Hartlauer Hadelsgesellschaft, 1988 E.C.R. I-4799 (Directive does not allow members to adopt
international exhaustion rules); Case C-173/98, Sebago Inc. and Ancienne Maison Dubois et
Fils, SA v. GB Unic, SA., 2 C.M.L.R. 1317 (1999) (similar).
176. See supra note 175.
177. Directive 2001/29, of the EU Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society,
art. 28, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 1 (copyrights in general); Council Directive 91/250/EEC, of 14 May
1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, art. 4(c), 1991 O.J. (L 122) 1 (computer
software); Case T-198/98, Micro Leader Bus. v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. II-3989 (applying Di-
rective 91/250/EEC); Case C-51/75, EMI Records v. CBS, 1976 E.C.R. 811.
178. Directive 98/71/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October
1998 on the Legal Protections of Designs, art. 15, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 1 (EC) (designs in gen-
eral); Council Regulation 6/2002, of 12 December 2001 on Community Designs, art. 21 , 2001
O.J. (L 3) 1 (EC) (Community Designs).
179. Merck Canada, Inc. v. Sigma Pharm. plc, [2012] EWPCC 18 (patentee could sue for
infringement where drug was imported into United Kingdom from Poland where drug was not
patent eligible in Poland before its accession into European Union); Case 187/80, Merck & Co.
v. Stephar BV & Petrus Stephanus Exler, 1981 E.C.R. 2063 (1981) (exhaustion within Euro-
pean Union); Cases C-267/95 and 268/95 Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd. [1996] E.C.R. I-
6285 (similar).
180. Generics (UK) Ltd. v. Smith Kline and French Labs. Ltd., 1992 E.C.R. I-5335, at
para. 17 (noting that while Articles 30 and 36 prohibit restrictions on trade within the EU, each
member country can decide for itself whether to permit importation of patented goods from
outside the EU).
181. Japan, too, has had no occasion to address the end run scenario. Trademarks are
subject to international exhaustion, provided the goods are genuine. See Osaka Chiho Saiban-
sho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] Feb. 27, 1970, 234 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 57 (Japan); Tokyo Chiho
Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Dec. 7, 1984, 1141 HANREI JIHÔ [HANJI] 143, 201 (Japan). Inter-
national exhaustion also applies to copyrighted works, with the exception of motion pictures.
Copyright Act, Arts. 26, 26-2 (Japan). With respect to patents, the law is less clear, but interna-
tional exhaustion appears to be the general rule, except where the Japanese patentee gives
notice to its foreign purchasers that importation is prohibited. BBS Kraftfahrzeugtechnik AG
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The problem has, however, presented itself in several other countries
that resemble the United States in applying inconsistent exhaustion rules to
copyrights and trademarks. In recent years, the question has squarely
presented itself in Australia, Singapore, South Africa, and Canada.  In these
countries, courts and legislatures have had to consider whether trademark
owners should be permitted to use copyright law to block parallel imports
that would otherwise be permitted under trademark law.  Examining their
attempts to resolve the issue can be instructive for the United States and
other countries that intend to retain different exhaustion rules for different
intellectual property regimes.
Of the four countries examined here, both Australia and Singapore have
adopted legislation limiting such uses of copyright law, but they have also
liberalized their approach to parallel imports of copyrighted works to a de-
gree that, prior to Kirtsaeng, would have been politically unthinkable in the
United States.182 A court in South Africa attempted through judicial interpre-
tation to limit the use of copyright law as mutant trademark law, but its
decision was overturned on appeal.183 Canada’s highest court narrowly re-
jected an attempt to carve out a similar exemption in Canadian copyright
law. Each of these developments may serve as useful guidance for crafting a
legislative solution in the United States.
A. Australian Legislation
Australian trademark law offers trademark owners limited protection
against parallel imports of genuine goods. Under the law of unfair competi-
tion, a trademark owner can block the importation of materially different
goods.184 In the absence of material differences, however, the importation of
genuine trademarked goods is generally permitted.185 Although case law
under the Trade Mark Act of 1955 was not entirely consistent, the Australian
courts eventually settled on a rule of international exhaustion for genuine
v. Racimex Japan KK (July 1, 1997), Heisei, (1995) (o) No. 1998, Hanrei Jiho 1612-3, 29 IIC
331, 334 (1998) (the “Aluminum Wheels” case). See Tessensohn & Yamamoto, The Big Alu-
minum Wheel Dust Up – International Exhaustion of Rights in Japan, 20 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 228, 228 (1998). See generally Kazunori Kurusu, Thoughts on Parallel Importation in
Japan: Patented Products, Genuine Products Bearing Trademarks and Copies of a Copy-
righted Work, KURUSU PATENT LAW OFFICE (Nov. 2, 1999), http://homepage2.nifty.com/
kurusu-patent/information_parallel_importation_e.htm.
182. See infra notes 205-215, 242-254 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 257-268 and accompanying text.
184. See Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), sch 2 § 18 (Austl.); Star Micronics
(Pty.) Ltd. v. Five Star Computers (Pty.) Ltd. (1991) 22 IPR 473 (Austl.) (printers were materi-
ally different because they used the wrong voltage for Australia); see also DAVISON ET AL.,
supra note 25, at 161-62.
185. Polo/Ralph Lauren Co. v. Ziliani Holdings (Pty.) Ltd., [2008] FCAFC 195, ¶ 5
(Austl.) (citing Champagne Heidsieck et Cie Monopole Societe Anonyme v. Buxton [1930] 1
Ch 662 (Austl.); Atari Inc. v. Fairstar Elecs. (Pty.) Ltd. (1982) 50 ALR 274 (Austl.).
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trademarked goods.186 Thus, Australia offers slightly less protection to trade-
mark owners than does the United States.187
The 1995 amendments to Australian trademark law continue to limit the
ability of trademark owners to block parallel imports. Section 123 of the
1995 Trade Marks Act eliminates liability for trademark infringement when-
ever the owner of the registered mark in Australia has consented to the use
of that mark on the goods in question.188 Courts interpreting Section 123,
however, have added a judicial gloss on the concept of consent. If the trade-
mark owner conditions its consent on a requirement that the licensee dis-
186. In the first parallel import case arising under the 1955 Act, Atari Inc. v. Dick Smith
Elecs. (Pty.) Ltd. (1980) 33 ALR 20, 21 (Austl.), the defendant imported and sold genuine
Atari products it had purchased from a foreign distributor that was not authorized to distribute
the merchandise in Australia. Reluctant to resolve the infringement question on the merits, the
court granted Atari an interlocutory injunction based largely on the balance of hardships, and
the parties eventually settled. Atari Inc. v. Fairstar Elecs. (1982) 50 ALR 274, 275-76 (Austl.)
(noting the settlement). Two years later, however, the Federal Court of Australia addressed
nearly identical facts in Atari Inc., 50 ALR 274 and ruled in favor of the importer. The court
relied on English precedent, Champagne Heidsieck, 1 Ch 330, which held that the fundamental
purpose of trademark protection was to allow the owner of the mark to prevent others from
selling someone else’s goods under the same mark, and that no infringement occurred when
the goods sold under the mark were indeed the goods of the trademark owner. Champagne
Heidsieck, 1 Ch at 341. The Federal Court noted that this interpretation was necessary in order
to preserve the right of consumers to resell genuine trademarked merchandise they had pur-
chased through lawful channels. See also DAVISON ET AL., supra note 25, at 157.
187. One difference is that, in the United States, Section 526 of the Tariff Act allows
U.S. owners of registered trademarks to block imports of genuine goods manufactured by non-
affiliates. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
188. Trade Marks Act 1995, (Cth) s 123 (Austl.); see, e.g., Sporte Leisure Pty. Ltd. v.
Paul’s Int’l (Pty.) Ltd. (No. 3), [2010] FCA 1162, ¶ 24 (Austl.) (“By virtue of s 123 of the Act
the respondents will not have infringed the . . . trade marks by importing or supplying goods to
which the trade marks were applied with the [trade mark owner’s] consent.”); Transport Tyre
Sales (Pty.) Ltd. v. Montana Tyres Rims & Tubes (Pty.) Ltd. [1999] FCA 329, ¶¶ 90-98
(Austl.) (importation of tires from Singapore without consent of exclusive Australian distribu-
tor was lawful because Japanese owner of Australian trademark registration had consented to
their manufacture). It is unsettled whether consent by a foreign affiliate would be imputed to
the domestic trademark owner. In Brother Indus. Ltd. v. Dynamic Supplies (Pty.) Ltd. (2007)
73 IPR 507 (Austl.), the Federal Court of Australia implied that it would not. See Joanne
Martin, Parallel Importation Law in Australia, FB RICE (June 10, 2011), http: //www.fbrice.
com.au/publication/The_Parallel_Universe.aspx. Australian attorneys have advised owners of
multinational trademarks to assign the Australian trademark to a domestic entity (a corporate
affiliate or an independent distributor). This may eliminate the Section 123 defense when the
foreign entity, and not the assignee of the Australian trademark, consents to the use of the
mark on the goods that are later imported without the consent of the Australian assignee. See
Stern & Wu, supra note 6. That this strategy works in theory was acknowledged by the Federal
Court of Australia in Transport Tyre Sales, [1999] FCA 329, although in that case the court
found no infringement because the parties failed to carry out the assignment before the defen-
dant imported the goods. This strategy is riskier if the Australian assignee is a corporate affili-
ate of the foreign entity that consented to the use of the mark—as opposed to an independent
distributor—because the relationship between the corporate affiliates might lead a court to
treat the affiliates as a single entity which consented to the use of the mark, thus triggering the
Section 123 defense. Stern & Wu, supra note 6.
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tribute the trademarked goods only in a particular territory, and the goods are
subsequently distributed outside of that territory, then, under certain circum-
stances, a court may find that consent is absent. According to the Federal
Court of Australia (FCA),189 “the registered owner would not usually be re-
garded as having consented to the application of the mark to goods which
the other person knows at the time he or she applies the mark are to be
supplied by him or her outside the territory.”190
The key factor, therefore, is whether the person who applied the mark to
the goods knew that they would be distributed in violation of the territorial
limitations of the license.191 Absent such knowledge, importation of the
goods into Australia does not infringe the trademark. Accordingly, despite
the judicial narrowing of the concept of consent, it appears that Australian
courts will not find trademark infringement where the trademarked goods
are initially sold in the proper territory but subsequently find their way to
Australia. Thus, even after the 1995 legislation, the owners of Australian
trademarks do not have full control over the unauthorized importation of
genuine goods. As in the United States, this gap in protection against parallel
imports led trademark owners to seek remedies outside of trademark law.
In the 1980s, Australian trademark owners began to pursue copyright
infringement as an alternative avenue of relief. Under Australian copyright
law, the unauthorized importation of copyrighted works (even if lawfully
made overseas) can give rise to infringement liability,192 as can the public
display or distribution of those imported copies.193 Several industries took
189. The FCA is roughly comparable to a federal district court in the United States.
190. Sporte Leisure, [2010] FCA 1162, ¶ 78 (emphasis added); see also id. ¶ 90 (noting
that court would have found consent “but for the fact that the goods were manufactured . . . for
sale outside [the authorized territory]”). On appeal, the Full Court of the FCA agreed, noting
that the licensee who placed the mark on goods which it intended to distribute in unauthorized
territories “stood in no different position to a third party applying the . . . marks who had no
license agreement” with the trademark owner. Paul’s Retail Pty. Ltd. v. Sporte Leisure Pty.
Ltd. [2012] FCAFC 51, ¶ 70 (Austl.).
191. The same reasoning could apply if the manufacturer produced more units than the
trademark owner authorized. See DAVISON ET AL., supra note 25, at 161.
192. Australia Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 37.
193. Id. s 38. Although Australia today exempts some categories of copyrighted works
from these restrictions, see infra notes 202-212 and accompanying text, the standards for in-
fringement liability remain the same. In contrast to the United States, infringing distribution
and importation are not strict liability causes of action in Australia. Under both Sections 37
and 38, infringement arises only if the defendant knew or “ought reasonably to have known”
that the article was infringing. Id. ss 37(1), 38(1). In the case of imported copies, the knowl-
edge requirement is satisfied if the defendant knew or should have known that the article
would be infringing had it been made in Australia by the importer. Thus, even a copy that was
lawfully manufactured outside of Australia can be infringing if (as will almost always be true
in a case of unauthorized importation) the importer lacked authority to manufacture it in
Australia.
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advantage of these rules to block parallel imports of genuine goods, includ-
ing the liquor, footwear, and sunglasses industries.194
In 1986, the Supreme Court of New South Wales195 upheld this use of
copyright law, holding in R & A Bailey & Co. Ltd. v. Boccaccio Pty Ltd.196
that “the right of exclusive use conferred . . . upon the registered proprietor”
of a trademark “only operates to prevent the sale in Australia of goods which
are not the proprietor’s but which are marked with the proprietor’s mark.”197
Accordingly, where the trademark owner placed its mark on bottles of Bai-
ley’s Irish Cream liqueur that were made in Ireland but intended for sale in
Holland, the unauthorized importation and sale of those bottles in Australia
did not infringe the Australian trademark.198 As a result, the trademark
owner invoked its rights under copyright law. Because various aspects of the
label were protected by copyright law, the Supreme Court of New South
Wales held that importing the bottles bearing those labels infringed the
plaintiff’s copyright: “[A] person who has both a trade mark and a copyright
is generally entitled to protection against both.”199
Shortly after Bailey was decided, Australia’s Copyright Law Review
Committee recommended legislation that would partially overturn Bailey by
prohibiting the use of copyright law to block the importation of
noncopyrightable merchandise.200 The Committee’s Report stated:
The Committee is strongly of opinion that distributors of goods
should not be able to control the market for their products by resort-
ing to the subterfuge of devising a label or a package in which copy-
right will subsist. The purpose of copyright is to protect articles that
are truly copyright articles such as books, sound recordings or films.
This purpose is achieved by conferring on authors of works and
makers of subject matter a bundle of exclusive rights entitling them
to restrain conduct antipathetical to their incorporeal property and to
sue for damages where such conduct has already been committed. If
the simple expedient of affixing or attaching a label in which copy-
right subsists to any goods at all entitles the owner of the goods to
exclude others from marketing similar goods, the sooner the prac-
tice is stopped the better it will be. However imaginatively labelled
194. Polo/Ralph Lauren Co. v. Ziliani Holdings (Pty.) Ltd. [2008] FCA 49, ¶ 56 (Austl.).
195. This is the highest court in the territory of New South Wales, but its decisions can
be appealed to the High Court of Australia. Thus, this court is analogous to a state supreme
court in the United States.
196. R & A Bailey & Co. Ltd. v. Boccaccio (Pty.) Ltd. (1986) 84 FLR 232 (Austl.).
197. Id. at 239.
198. Id. at 233-34, 239. This reasoning was consistent with earlier judicial
interpretations.
199. Id. at 243 (citing Tavener Rutledge Ltd v. Specters Ltd. [1959] RPC 83 and Ogden
Indus. (Pty.) Ltd v Kis (Austl.) (Pty.) Ltd (1982) 2 NSWLR 283, 300).
200. Polo/Ralph Lauren Co., [2008] FCA 49, ¶ 53; Stern & Wu, supra note 6.
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or packaged a bottle of liquor may be, the product is liquor. The
same may be said of cigarettes, perfume and cosmetics.201
Although this recommendation led to no immediate changes, in the en-
suing years Australia liberalized its parallel import policies for many classes
of copyrightable goods in an effort to increase availability and reduce con-
sumer prices.202 Import restrictions on books were loosened, though not
eliminated, in 1991.203 Import restrictions on sound recordings were elimi-
nated in 1998.204 In 2003, the law was further liberalized to permit parallel
imports of books, journals and music in electronic formats, as well as com-
puter software.205 In each case, the permissive policies have applied only to
noninfringing copies.
When the import restrictions on sound recordings were eliminated in
1998, the owners of sound recording copyrights faced competition from
cheaper parallel imports. Because commercial CDs include copyrightable el-
ements other than recorded music—such as cover art and liner notes—copy-
right owners might have been able to continue blocking parallel imports of
CDs by asserting infringement of these other copyrightable components.
Australia’s Parliament sought to prevent this, and at the same time to put an
end to the strategy that succeeded in the Bailey case—the use of copyrighted
labels to restrict parallel imports of uncopyrightable goods.206
The Parliament accomplished both of these goals by adding Section 44C
to the Copyright Act.207 Section 44C provides that the importation or sale of
an imported article208 does not infringe the copyright in any content appear-
201. Polo/Ralph Lauren, [2008] FCA 49, ¶ 53 (quoting COPYRIGHT LAW REVIEW COM-
MITTEE, THE IMPORTATION PROVISIONS OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT 1968 224 (1988)).
202. See DAVISON ET AL., supra note 25, at 287-91.
203. Copyright Amendment Act 1991 (Austl.) (adding ss 44A, 112A); see Austl. Gov’t
Productivity Comm’n, supra note 13, at 60-61; DAVISON ET AL., supra note 25, at 287.
204. Copyright Amendment Act (No. 2) 1998 (Austl.) (amending Section 10(1) and ad-
ding Sections 10AA, 44D, 112D, and 130A). A copy of a sound recording is noninfringing if it
was made (1) without infringement in the country of manufacture, (2) in a country where it is
not protected by copyright, or (3) with the consent of the party that owns the copyright in the
country where the recording was made. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 10AA (Austl.). The defen-
dant has the burden of proving that the copies are noninfringing. Id. s 130A.
205. The Copyright (Parallel Importation) Act 2003 (Austl.) (adding ss 44F and 112DA).
As in the case of sound recordings, the defendant has the burden of proving that the copies are
noninfringing. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s 130B-C (Austl.).
206. Polo/Ralph Lauren, [2008] FCA 49, at ¶¶ 52-54.
207. Copyright Amendment Act (No. 1) 1998 (Austl.) (amending s 10(1) and adding ss
44C and 112C); see Preventing Parallel Imports Under Other Legal Theories, supra note 174
(noting that the 1998 amendments took effect in 2000).
208. The Copyright Act does not provide a general-purpose definition of the term “arti-
cle.” Section 38, which prohibits distribution of infringing articles, states that an article “in-
cludes a reproduction or copy of a work or other subject-matter, being a reproduction or copy
in electronic form.” Australia Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 38(3). Section 115, which authorizes
injunctive relief in cases of electronic commercial infringement, includes the same language.
Id. s 115 (7), (8). It is not clear whether Parliament intended these statements to be definitions
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ing in an “accessory” to the article, provided that the accessory is itself non-
infringing.209 To be noninfringing, the copyrighted content in the accessory
must have been reproduced in a Berne or WTO country with the consent of
the person owning the copyright in that country.210 The current statute211
defines “accessory” to include labels, packaging, containers, instructions,
warranties or other information “provided with” the article, as well as in-
structional sound recordings or films “provided with” the article.212 Had Sec-
tion 44C been in effect at the time of the Bailey case, the plaintiff could not
have used the copyright in its label to prevent the importation of its product.
In interpreting Section 44C, a significant challenge facing the Australian
courts has been the meaning of “accessory.” Although the FCA has issued
only two opinions interpreting this language, together they highlight the dif-
ficulty of distinguishing true accessories from integral product features on
the one hand, and insufficiently related items on the other. Accordingly, they
reveal the potential for additional interpretive challenges in the future.
The first and most significant case interpreting Section 44C was the
2008 case of Polo/Lauren Co. LP v. Ziliani Holdings Pty Ltd.213 The FCA
held that the polo player logo that was woven into the plaintiff’s shirts was a
label, and therefore an accessory.214 Accordingly, the plaintiff could not use
the copyright in the logo to block importation of genuine Polo/Lauren shirts
purchased outside of Australia.
Although the definition of “accessory” included “a label . . . incorpo-
rated into the surface of . . . the article,” the court considered whether the
embroidered polo player logo was a label or a decorative feature.215 The
court adopted a broad definition of the term “label,” to include its usage as a
(in which case “article” would be limited to digital copies) or merely to clarify that the term
“article” includes digital copies as well as other tangible items. The opinions in Polo/Ralph
Lauren, [2008] FCAFC 195 (Austl.) and QS Holdings SARL v. Paul’s Retail (Pty.) Ltd., [2011]
FCA 853 (Austl.), clearly assume the latter. Although a “work” is defined as “a literary, dra-
matic, musical or artistic work,” Australia Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 (Austl.), the phrase
“work or other subject matter” in Section 38 implies that an article can be a copy of something
other than a copyrightable work. The Full Court opinion in Polo/Lauren notes that the parties
did not dispute that articles of clothing can be “articles” within the meaning of Section 44C,
see Polo/Ralph Lauren, [2008] FCAFC 195 at ¶ 12. In addition, limiting the definition of
“articles” to copies of copyrightable works would fail to overrule Bailey.
209. Australia Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) (Austl.) (defining “non-infringing
accessory”).
210. Id.
211. The definition of “accessory” was expanded in 2003 to permit parallel imports of
books, journals, and music in electronic formats as well as software. Copyright Amendment
(Parallel Importation) Bill 2003 (Cth) sch 1 (Austl.); see supra note 205 and accompanying
text.
212. Id. s 10(1) (defining “accessory”).
213. Polo/Ralph Lauren Co. v. Ziliani Holdings (Pty.) Ltd. [2008] FCA 49 (Austl.). The
FCA opinion was upheld by the Full Court. Polo/Ralph Lauren, [2008] FCAFC 195.
214. Polo/Lauren Co., [2008] FCA, at ¶ 64.
215. Id. ¶¶ 43, 62-64.
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synonym for “brand name, trade mark and the name by which a design or
fashion house . . . is generally known.”216 To determine whether the polo
player image was a label or some other component of the product, the court
applied a functionality test:
The definition of an “accessory” in s 10(1) recognises a distinction
between the article as a functional item of commerce, and a subsidi-
ary constituent part of the article such as a label embroidered on to
it. The embroidered component is functionally accessorial to the ar-
ticle’s use. The function which an accessory, as described in
pars (a)–(d) of the definition of “accessory” in s 10(1), performs is
incidental to the use of the article as an item of commerce. The
article can be used for its intended purpose regardless of whether
the s 10 “accessory” is present on it or as part of it. The Parliament
intended that a noninfringing accessory, as defined in s 10(1), could
be embroidered into an article even though, had the noninfringing
accessory been sold by itself without the article, the owner of copy-
right in it would have been entitled to protection in Australia under
the Copyright Act.217
The court concluded that, even if the polo player logo was aesthetically
pleasing, it functioned primarily as a label because it informed consumers of
the “provenance” of the merchandise:
The embroidered polo player logo is not primarily a decorative fea-
ture, although it can be attractive to the eye in some of its manifes-
tations. The polo player logo will usually remain covered by the
wearer’s outer clothing when it appears on the hem of an item of
underwear . . . . This may not always be the case, but this position-
ing of the polo player logo suggests that, at least on such a garment,
its function is primarily to signify the manufacturer’s identity, ie to
act as a label.218
Three years later, in QS Holdings SARL v. Paul’s Retail Pty Ltd.,219 a
defendant had imported and sold both genuine and counterfeit apparel bear-
ing the plaintiffs’ registered trademarks. With respect to the counterfeit
goods, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment of
trademark infringement.220 In addition to the trademark claims, however,
216. Id. ¶ 51. On appeal, the Full Court noted that this passage does not reject other
common applications of the term “label,” such as swing tags and other physical labels. Polo/
Lauren Co., [2008] FCA 853, ¶¶ 13-15. It also rejected the argument that the embroidered logo
was conceptually inseparable from the garment itself. Id. ¶ 22.
217. Polo/Lauren Co., [2008] FCA 49, ¶ 58.
218. Id. ¶ 63.
219. QS Holdings SARL v. Paul’s Retail (Pty.) Ltd., [2011] FCA 853 (Austl.).
220. Id. ¶ 37.
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several plaintiffs also raised claims of copyright infringement, based on the
graphic designs on the clothing as well as images of the clothing reproduced
in the defendant’s sales brochures. Some, but not all, of the copyrighted
designs were reproduced on clothing made outside of Australia without the
consent of the Australian copyright owners.221 Even with respect to the
clothing that bore authorized reproductions, the Federal Court held that the
defendant would still be liable for copyright infringement if it imported and
sold the clothing without the consent of the Australian copyright owners.222
The defendants did not attempt to raise a defense under Section 44C, pre-
sumably because they were unlikely to convince the court that the graphic
designs on these garments were “accessories” rather than decorative features
integral to the products themselves.
As for the marketing brochures that reproduced the copyrighted designs,
several of the defendants attempted to invoke Section 44C.223 The court,
however, found Section 44C inapplicable because, among other things, the
brochures were not accessories under Section 44C. An accessory, the court
held, must have “some physical relationship” with the merchandise to which
it relates.224 Accordingly, the plaintiff could use copyright law to prevent
importation and distribution of the clothing as well as the brochures.225
Both of the copyrightable items in QS Holdings were ineligible for the
Section 44C exemption—the graphics on the shirt because (presumably)
they were not separate enough to be an accessory, and the brochures be-
cause they were too separate to be an accessory. Future courts may find
themselves searching for the happy medium of separateness necessary for an
item to qualify as an accessory. Why is it that the logo woven into the Polo/
Lauren shirt was an accessory, and the graphics on the QS Holdings shirts
were not? Under the functionality test adopted in Polo/Lauren, the graphics
on the QS Holdings shirts arguably played in important role in the function-
ing of the shirt, by making it more attractive, rather than merely communi-
cating the provenance of the garment.226 Under this test, the graphics were
not accessories.
However, some designs that serve a trademark function can also contrib-
ute to the aesthetic appeal of the product incorporating them. How will the
Australian courts address such dual-function designs under the functionality
test? The concept of what is an accessory is likely to continue to force Aus-
221. Id. ¶¶ 83, 96.
222. Id. ¶ 92.
223. Id. ¶ 119.
224. Id. ¶ 124. The court’s second reason was that Section 44C applies only to accesso-
ries that are imported, and there was no indication that the brochures had been imported. Id.
225. Id.
226. This analysis echoes the treatment of product configuration trade dress in U.S.
trademark law. See, e.g., Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213-14
(2000) (decorative features of apparel could not be protected as trade dress absent secondary
meaning).
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tralian courts to make difficult line-drawing judgments. It is also likely to
encourage trademark owners to avoid the “accessory” classification by in-
corporating copyrightable designs more fully into their merchandise, rather
than limiting it to labels, regardless of whether the design also functions as a
trademark.
The success of this strategy, however, will be limited by Sections 75 and
77 of Australian copyright law. Section 77 expressly permits the unautho-
rized reproduction of copyrightable three-dimensional designs in products,
once those designs have been lawfully embodied in products offered for sale
or hire, if the designs are either (1) not eligible for registration under Austra-
lia’s industrial design statute,227 or (2) if eligible, have not been so regis-
tered.228 Once a design has been registered, under Section 75 it is no longer
eligible for copyright protection.229 The purpose of these rules is to eliminate
the overlap between copyright and industrial design protection with respect
to three-dimensional designs.230 As a result, only two-dimensional designs
are eligible for dual protection under both copyright and trademark law.231
Consider, for example, a candy maker that manufactures chocolate bars
in artistic shapes. Regardless of whether these designs are distinctive enough
to qualify as trademarks, they may be sufficiently original to enjoy copyright
protection. Can the Australian copyright owner control importation of the
chocolate bars that incorporate the copyrightable design? In this scenario,
the design is probably too integrated into the product to qualify for the “ac-
cessory” exception that permitted unauthorized importation in Polo/ Lauren.
Nonetheless, Australian copyright still permits importation on these
facts, because, in effect, it denies copyright protection to the design element.
Because Section 77 permits the unauthorized reproduction of unregistered
three-dimensional designs on merchandise, the copyright owner in the above
example cannot use Sections 37 and 38 to prevent the importation and distri-
bution of the chocolate bars embodying the copyrighted design. By their
own terms, Sections 37 and 38 apply only if manufacturing the candy in
Australia would infringe copyright, and Section 77 makes clear that this
would not be the case.232
227. Designs Act 2003 (Austl.).
228. Australia Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 77(2)-(3).
229. Id. s 75.
230. Polo/Ralph Lauren Co. v. Ziliani Holdings (Pty.) Ltd., [2008] FCAFC 195, ¶¶ 48-
50, 52-53 (Austl.). Industrial design protection under Australian law is somewhat similar to
design patent protection under United States law. However, under U.S. law it is possible for
the same design to enjoy both copyright and design patent protection, whether it is two-or
three-dimensional. See In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
231. Id. ¶¶ 49, 57.
232. In Polo/Lauren, the Full Court of the FCA considered whether the embroidered polo
player design satisfied the requirements of Section 77. To qualify, the design would have to be
“embodied” in the clothing rather than a mere label, and it would have to be three-dimen-
sional. Id. ¶¶ 48-57. Because the Court concluded that the design was merely a label, it was not
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Thus, just as Kirtsaeng may prompt U.S. trademark owners to make
greater use of design patents as a means to exclude unauthorized imports,
Section 44C may induce Australian trademark owners to pursue industrial
design registrations as an alternative to copyright and trademark
protection.233
B. Singaporean Legislation
Singapore’s trademark law is relatively permissive with respect to paral-
lel imports. It expressly permits the importation of goods which have been
released into the market anywhere in the world with the express or implied
consent of the owner of the Singapore trademark registration, even if that
consent is conditional—for example, if it is conditioned on distributing the
goods only within a specified territory.234 In contrast, if a party that owned
the trademark outside of Singapore authorized the foreign sales, then the
goods are not considered genuine, and the Singapore trademark owner can
block their importation.235 If, however, the Singapore trademark owner and
the foreign trademark owner are related entities, then, depending on the na-
ture of their relationship, the Singapore trademark owner may be deemed to
have implicitly consented to the use of the mark, in which case importation
is permitted.236 Trademark exhaustion does not apply, and thus parallel im-
ports can be blocked, where the product in question has been altered after its
sufficiently embodied in the garment to satisfy Section 77. Id. ¶ 57. Because Section 77 did not
apply, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the raised stitching of the design
made it three-dimensional. Id.
233. In Australia, industrial design registrations are available only for new designs, with
one exception: They are also available for copyrighted designs, regardless of novelty, as long
as the designs have not previously been applied to products. Designs Act 2003 ss 15(1), 18
(Austl.). If renewed, the registration provides 10 years of exclusive rights. Id. s 46(1).
234. Trade Marks Act § 29(1) (Sing.); see Burton Ong, IPRs and Competition Law in
Singapore, in THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION
POLICY 399 (Steven J. Anderman ed., 2007).
235. Ong, supra note 234, at 399.
236. Burton Ong draws this conclusion from Pan-West (Pte) Ltd. v. Grand Bigwin (Pte)
Ltd., [2003] SGHC 250 (Sing.) (implicitly endorsing the reasoning of the United Kingdom
court in Revlon Inc. v. Cripps & Lee Ltd, [1980] FSR 85), and Hup Huat Food Industries (S)
Pte Ltd. v. Liang Chiang Heng, [2003] SGHC 244 (Sing.). Ong, supra note 234, at 400, 421
n.97. The same principle was applied in a passing off case, Sin Heak Hin Pte Ltd. & Anor v.
Yuasa Battery Singapore Pte Ltd. [1995] 3 SLR 590 (Sing.), where Yuasa brand batteries
made in China were imported to Singapore without the consent of the owner of Yuasa Singa-
pore, in breach of the licensing agreement between Yuasa Japan (the parent of Yuasa Singa-
pore) and the Chinese manufacturer. When the domestic distributor published circulars
characterizing the imported batteries as imitations, the importer brought claims of defamation
and slander of goods, and the defendant counterclaimed for passing off. The court ruled in the
plaintiff’s favor, holding that, absent proof that the batteries had been made without the con-
sent of Yuasa Japan, they were genuine goods, and were therefore entitled to bear the Yuasa
mark even when imported into Singapore. See Copyright Law and Parallel Imports, TAN LENG
CHEO & PARTNERS (Aug. 28, 2001), available at http://www.accountlaw-tax.com.sg/Web-
site_tlc/ws-parallel%20import.htm.
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initial release into the market and the use of the mark on the altered goods
dilutes the mark’s distinctive character.237
Prior to 1994, it was unclear whether the importation of copyrighted
works that were lawfully made in their country of manufacture required the
consent of the Singapore copyright owner.238 In 1994, however, the copy-
right law was amended in favor of parallel imports, by allowing importation
of copies that were made with the consent of the person who owned the
copyright in the country where the copies were made, even if that same
person did not own the copyright in Singapore.239 The same amendment also
provides that the existence of consent is determined without regard to any
“conditions as to the sale, distribution or other dealings in the article after its
making.”240 Thus, even if the owner of a copyright in India consented to the
copying and distribution of that work only in India, that consent would en-
able those copies to be imported into Singapore despite the objections of the
Singapore copyright owner.241
237. Trade Marks Act § 29(2) (Sing.). This rule resulted from a 2004 amendment. See
Ong, supra note 234, at 420-21 n.93.
238. Copyright Act §§ 32, 25(2) (Sing.); see Teresa Hangchi, Singapore, in COMPARA-
TIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: SPECIAL ISSUE 289 (Dennis Campbell &
Susan Cotter eds. 1997); Ong, supra note 234, at 384; George Sze Shun Wei, Parallel Imports
and Intellectual Property Rights in Singapore, 2 SING. ACAD. L.J. 286, 303-06 (1990).
239. Copyright Act §§ 32, 25(3) (Sing.); see Hangchi, supra note 238, at 289. If there is
no copyright owner in the country of manufacture (that is, if the work is not protected by
copyright in that country), then the consent of the Singapore copyright owner is required.
Copyright Act § 25(3)(b) (Sing.); Hawin, supra note 12, at 97-98. The 1994 legislation over-
ruled a 1993 decision of the Singapore High Court, Public Prosecutor v. Teo Ai Nee, 1993
SLR LEXIS 476, that had allowed a copyright owner to block parallel imports of nonpirated
copies, a ruling which had enabled copyright owners to block parallel imports by assigning
their Singapore copyrights to a Singapore entity. See Hawin, supra note 12, at 97-98; Ng-Loy
Wee Loon, Singapore, in BALANCING COPYRIGHT—A SURVEY OF NATIONAL APPROACHES
840, 840 n.40 (Reto M. Hilty & Sylvie Nérisson eds., 2012); Ong, supra note 234, at 384, 416
n.45; George Sze Shun Wei, The Law of Copyrights in Singapore §§ 8.199-8.211 (2000). In
Remus Innovation & Anor v. Hong Boon Siong & Ors, 1994 SLR LEXIS 621 (Sing.), the
amended law prevented a manufacturer from blocking parallel imports of automobile exhaust
systems that were made with the Singapore copyright owner’s consent and obtained from an
authorized distributor in the United Kingdom. The plaintiff had asserted that the importers
infringed the copyright in certain drawings of the exhaust systems. See Copyright Law and
Parallel Imports, supra note 236; Hawin, supra note 12, at 97; Singapore – Parallel Imports
of Genuine Products Allowed, LADAS & PARRY LLP (Nov. 1995), available at http://www.
ladas.com/BULLETINS/1995/1195Bulletin/Singapore_ParallelImports.html (citing the case as
Remus Innovations v. Jeep Chee). Importation of copyrighted goods for commercial purposes
without the consent of the Singapore copyright owner infringes only if the importer “knows, or
ought reasonably to know, that the making of the article was carried out without the consent of
the owner of the copyright.” Copyright Act §§ 32, 104 (Sing.). The same standard determines
liability for selling or otherwise commercially distributing the imported goods. Id. §§ 33, 105.
240. Copyright Act § 25(4) (Sing.); Hawin, supra note 12, at 97-98.
241. See Ong, supra note 234, at 385.
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Singapore’s copyright law also includes a provision similar to Austra-
lia’s “accessories” provision.242 Section 40A of the Singapore Copyright Act
provides that the importation and distribution of an “accessory” does not
infringe a copyright when the accessory is imported along with a noninfring-
ing article.243 The Singapore statute defines “accessories” to include labels,
packaging, containers, leaflets, pamphlets, certificates, warranties,
brochures, and “written instructions or other information” that are incidental
to the article, as well as instructional sound recordings and films that are
incidental to the article.244
Section 40A, however, differs from its Australian counterpart in several
respects, and affords weaker protection against parallel imports. First,
whereas the Australian statute specifies that the accessory must have been
made with the consent of the party that owns the copyright in the country of
manufacture,245 Section 40A contains no such requirement. In fact, it is si-
lent on the question whether the accessory itself must be noninfringing.
Thus, it appears that accessories such as labels and brochures can be im-
ported and sold with the noninfringing articles they accompany even if the
accessories themselves are pirated copies.
In a second point of departure, Section 40A defines “accessory” more
narrowly than the Australian statute. Specifically, an “accessory” does not
include:
(i) a copy of a work that is incorporated into the surface of the
article and is a permanent part of the article;
242. Australia Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 10(1), 10AD, 44C, discussed supra at notes
207-212 and accompanying text.
243. Copyright Act § 40A (Sing.) provides:
Accessories to imported articles 40A. (1) The copyright in a work embodied in an
accessory to an article is not infringed by a person who, without the licence of the
owner of the copyright, imports the article into Singapore for a purpose mentioned
in section 32 (a), (b) or (c) unless the article is an infringing copy.
(2) The operation of this Act in relation to a work embodied in an article shall not be
affected by the operation of this section in relation to a work embodied in an acces-
sory to the article.
(3) If an article is imported into Singapore for a purpose mentioned in section 32
(a), (b) or (c) and the importation is not, by reason of this section, an infringement
of the copyright in a work embodied in an accessory to the article, the use of the
accessory with the article for any such purpose shall not be an infringement of the
copyright in the work, and section 33 shall not apply to the accessory.
See also Hangchi, supra note 238, at 290; Ong, supra note 234, at 385.
244. Copyright Act § 7(1), 116A (Sing.).
245. Australia Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 44C(1)-(2) (exempting only “non-infringing
accessories); s 10(1) (defining “non-infringing accessory”). The country of manufacture must
also be a member of the Berne Convention or a WTO member with TRIPS-compliant copy-
right laws. Id.
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(ii) a copy of a work that cannot be separated from the article
without rendering the article unsuitable for its ordinary use;
[or]
(iii) a manual sold with computer software for use in connection
with that software[.]246
The purpose of these exceptions is unclear. They do not allow copyright
owners to block all parallel importation of these three embodiments of copy-
righted works. Because Singapore allows importation of all copyrighted
works provided that the copies were made with the consent of the copyright
owner in the country of manufacture, these three nonaccessories, if
nonpirated, would still be importable under that general rule.
Perhaps the true impact of these exclusions derives from Section 40A’s
failure to expressly require that imported accessories be noninfringing. Sec-
tion 40A(1) states that:
The copyright in a work embodied in an accessory to an article is
not infringed by a person who, without the licence of the owner of
the copyright, imports the article into Singapore for a purpose men-
tioned in section 32 (a), (b) or (c) unless the article is an infringing
copy.247
Based on this language, an accessory attached to a noninfringing article
can be imported under Section 40A, even if the accessory is infringing. In
contrast, if an item (such as surface ornamentation) does not meet the statu-
tory definition of an accessory, then the Section 40A exemption does not
apply. Instead, the general rules of Sections 32 and 25—requiring the copy-
right owner’s consent for importation—will apply. This means that the three
copyrighted items excluded from the “accessory” definition cannot be im-
ported unless they were made under a license from the copyright owner in
the country where the copies were made.248
In the case of the first two exceptions, the accessory is so physically
integral to the article itself that it would make little sense to apply different
rules to the article and the accessory. The rationale for the third exception—
manuals for software—is less clear. These manuals are not physically inte-
grated into the software they accompany. On the other hand, significant in-
tellectual effort goes into creating (and translating) a software manual, in
contrast to the more perfunctory user manuals that typically accompany
other consumer products.249 This suggests that they deserve a level of copy-
246. Copyright Act § 7(1) (Sing.).
247. Id. § 40A(1).
248. Alternatively, if there is no copyright owner in the country of manufacture, then the
consent of the Singapore copyright owner would be required. See supra note 242.
249. “Good manuals are a scarce commodity—expensive to produce, difficult to main-
tain, the province of experts.” How to Write Software User Manuals, TUFFLEY COMPUTER
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right protection comparable to that of books and other substantial creative
works. The information contained in the manuals may also be essential to
the purchaser’s ability to understand and use the software; if so, then user
manuals contribute significant value to the software they accompany. Thus,
while they are not physically integral to the software, they may be viewed as
functionally integral.
Subjecting these three categories to the generally applicable rules for
importing copyrighted works is itself unremarkable. What is remarkable,
however, is that the items that do qualify as accessories are apparently ex-
empt from the general rule for parallel imports, and thus can be imported
even if they are pirated. Such a result would be impossible under the Austra-
lian statute, which permits importation only of “noninfringing” accesso-
ries.250 It is unclear why Singapore’s lawmakers chose to allow the
importation of infringing accessories. It was probably not a drafting error;
when the lawmakers created three exceptions to the definition of an acces-
sory, they must have intended to give those exceptions some legal effect. If
this was a deliberate choice, then it suggests that the legislature did not be-
lieve that infringing accessories cause significant harm to copyright owners.
By withholding a copyright remedy for infringing accessories, the legislature
reduced the potential for nuisance litigation that would interfere with lawful
importation of trademarked goods, while excluding from copyright protec-
tion a narrow category of works that typically lack significant creative or
intellectual content.251
As was the case in Australia, Singapore’s decision to prevent the use of
copyright law to block otherwise lawful imports of genuine trademarked
goods took place in the context of a broader decision to liberalize import
restrictions on copyrighted works. Even in a country that maintains import
restrictions, however, a specific exemption for accessories may be politically
feasible and economically sound. The exemption can be successful if it per-
mits the country to effectuate its trademark policies without interference
from copyright owners asserting infringement of works with minimal crea-
SERVICES, http://tuffley.com/tcs20000.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2013). “The user manual for
software is almost as important as the software itself.” C.D. Crowder, How to Write a User
Manual for Software, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/how_4827020_write-user-manual-
software.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
250. Australia Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 44C (1). See supra text accompanying notes
209-210.
251. In the United States, works such as labels and instructions are typically viewed as
having “thin” copyrights, warranting a lower degree of copyright protection. See, e.g.,
SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 29 n.5
(2d Cir. 2000) (“the danger lurking in copyright protection for labels is that the tail threatens to
wag the dog—proprietors at times seize on copyright protection for the label in order to lever-
age their thin copyright protection over the text . . . on the label into a monopoly on the
typically uncopyrightable product to which it is attached.”) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted).
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tive or intellectual content. Singapore’s statute offers a second possible
model for such legislation.
Nonetheless, in permitting the importation of pirated accessories, Singa-
pore’s approach goes further than necessary to prevent copyright claims
from interfering with trademark policy. As a result, this approach may be
politically unacceptable in countries with strong copyright laws, such as the
United States. A well-drafted accessories statute should be able to eliminate
litigation over trivial amounts of copyrighted material without endorsing
copyright piracy.
C. South Africa’s Failed Attempt at a Judicial Solution
In contrast to the laws of Australia and Singapore, courts in South Af-
rica have held that the unauthorized importation of goods is not trademark
infringement as long as the mark was applied to the goods with the consent
of the trademark owner,252 unless the goods have been materially altered
since they were manufactured.253 Accordingly, some trademark owners have
turned to copyright law for additional remedies against gray market goods.
Unlike Australia and Singapore, South Africa has not enacted any legislation
to curb this practice. As a result, trademark owners have successfully used
copyright law to achieve their goals by assigning the relevant copyrights to
South African assignees. In Frank & Hirsch (Pty) Ltd. v A Roopanand
252. Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 § 34(2)(d) (S. Afr.); see Protective Mining & Indus.
Equip. Sys.(Pty.) Ltd. v. Audiolens (Cape) (Pty.) Ltd., 1987 (2) SA 173 (A) (S. Afr.) (holding
that Pentax trademark was not infringed where genuine Pentax cameras were purchased abroad
and imported into South Africa, because there was no consumer confusion as to source). At-
tempts to use the common law of unfair competition to block parallel imports have also failed.
See, e.g., Taylor & Horne (Pty.) Ltd. v. Dentall (Pty.) Ltd., 1991 (1) SA 412 (AD) (S. Afr.)
(exclusive South African distributor could not block parallel imports of genuine goods). In
2007, in an effort to curtail parallel imports, South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry
issued a Notice requiring distributors of parallel imports to disclose to purchasers that they are
not authorized distributors, and that authorized distributors are not obligated to honor the
trademark owner’s warranties and after-sales service. See Angela van den Berg, When Things
Are Not Always Black and White: Grey Goods, ADAMS & ADAMS (Feb. 12, 2007), http://www.
adamsadams.com/index.php/media_centre/news/article/when_things_are_not_always_black_
and_white_grey_goods/. Failure to comply with this requirement will violate Section 12(6) of
the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act of 1988 (S. Afr.). Ryan Tucker, South
Africa: A New Solution to the Problem of Parallel Imports, INTA BULLETIN (May 15, 2007),
available at http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/SOUTHAFRICAANewSolutiontothe
ProblemofParallelImports.aspx. Subject only to this constraint, parallel importation of trade-
marked goods is still permitted.
253. See Television Radio Ctr (Pty.) Ltd v. Sony Kabushki Kaisha t/a Sony Corp. 1987
(2) SA 1 (SCA) at 16 (S. Afr.) (holding that Sony trademark was infringed where Sony video
recorders purchased in Europe were imported into South Africa, because the products ceased
to be “genuine” once the importer altered their tuners to pick up South African broadcasts).
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Brothers (Pty) Ltd.,254 this practice was upheld by one of South Africa’s
highest courts.
The defendant in Frank & Hirsch acquired genuine TDK brand tapes
(manufactured in Japan) from a distributor in Singapore, and imported them
into South Africa without the consent of Frank & Hirsch (F&H), the exclu-
sive authorized distributor of TDK tapes in South Africa. The court dis-
missed F&H’s claim of trademark infringement, holding that there was no
consumer deception, and thus no infringement, because the goods were gen-
uine.255 The plaintiffs then obtained an assignment from TDK of its South
Africa copyrights in the “get up and trade dress” (that is, the appearance) of
the TDK tapes and their packaging materials (not including the TDK trade-
marks),256 as well as a printed cardboard insert, and brought an infringement
claim under Section 23(2) of the South African Copyright Act.257
South Africa’s copyright law does not expressly permit the importation
of copyrightable “accessories” that accompany noninfringing goods. Despite
this, the lower court (referred to as the Court a quo) applied a similar con-
cept, holding that any copyrightable works that were incorporated into the
appearance and packaging of the tapes had merged into the products and
therefore ceased to be copies of copyrightable works.258 In essence, the cop-
254. Frank & Hirsch (Pty.) Ltd. v Roopanand Bros. (Pty.) Ltd. 1993 (4) SA 1 (SCA) (S.
Afr.). The Supreme Court’s appellate division, today known as the Supreme Court of Appeal,
is the nation’s second highest court. It is below the Constitutional Court.
255. Frank & Hirsch (Pty.) Ltd. v A Roopanand Bros. 1987 (3) SA 165(D & CLD) at
187-90 (S. Afr.).
256. Frank & Hirsch 1993 (4) SA at 7. Frank & Hirsch did not claim to own the copy-
rights in the TDK trademarks. Id. at 26.
257. Section 23 provides, in relevant part:
23. Infringement.
(1) Copyright shall be infringed by any person, not being the owner of the copy-
right, who, without the licence of such owner, does or causes any other person to do,
in the Republic, any act which the owner has the exclusive rights to do or to author-
ize.(2) Without derogating from the generality of subsection (1), copyright shall be
infringed by any person who, without the licence of the owner of the copyright and
at a time when copyright subsists in a work -
(a) imports an article into the Republic for a purpose other than for his private and
domestic use;(b) sells, lets, or by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire in
the Republic any article; [or](c) distributes in the Republic any article for the pur-
poses of trade, or for any other purpose, to such an extent that the owner of the
copyright in question is prejudicially affected . . . if to his knowledge the making of
that article constituted an infringement of that copyright or would have constituted
such an infringement if the article had been made in the Republic.
Copyright Act 98 of 1978 § 23 (S. Afr.). The current version of Section 23(2) is similar in all
relevant respects. See Copyright Act 98 of 1978 § 23 (BSRSA 2012) (S. Afr.).
258. Frank & Hirsch (Pty.) Ltd. v A Roopanand Bros. (Pty.) Ltd. 1991 (3) SA 240 (D &
CLD) at 245-46 (S. Afr.).
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yright in the accessories was extinguished when they were attached to un-
copyrightable goods:
The physical reproductions of the artistic or literary works compris-
ing the get-up were indeed accessory to the principal things, i.e. the
cassette tapes and by accessio or specificatio[259] became part of the
cassette tapes, the articles in question.260
Based on this reasoning, the lower court held that the importation of the
TDK tapes was noninfringing.261
The Supreme Court reversed. It rejected the merger analysis,262 and held
that (1) the packaging and cardboard inserts included copyrightable artistic
works,263 and (2) the assignee of the South African copyright was entitled to
prevent their importation and resale.264
The lower court had attempted to introduce, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, an exception to the copyright laws that was somewhat analo-
gous to, but arguably broader than, the exception for accessories that Austra-
lia adopted through legislation. The Supreme Court rejected this
interpretation because (1) it would effectively terminate a copyright in a
manner inconsistent with the termination provisions of the copyright stat-
utes, and (2) its potential scope was too broad:
It seems to be an inescapable consequence of the decision of the
Court a quo that wherever the physical reproduction of a work in
which A has the copyright becomes part of a “principal thing”
(which itself is either not the subject-matter of copyright or over
which A has no copyright) A loses his copyright and can have no
claim for its infringement. If this were so, the protection afforded to
an author by the copyright law would be nullified in a number of
important instances. Thus, for example, an artist who painted an
original artistic work would, presumably, not be entitled to sue
under either part of sec. 23 if a reproduction of that painting were
used without permission as a dust-cover for, or an illustration in, a
book of which someone else was the author. Similarly, a writer or
poet would have no claim against a publisher who unauthorizedly
259. Both concepts derive from ancient Roman property law. Under accessio, the owner-
ship of an accessory to an object belonged to the owner of the object. For example, if a
building was constructed on a person’s land, the building belonged to the landowner. Under
specificatio, the ownership of an object could change when the object (a block of marble, for
example) was transformed into something different (a sculpture).
260. Id. at 246.
261. Id. at 246.
262. Frank & Hirsch, 1993 (4) SA at 290.
263. Id. at 288.
264. Id. at 292.
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included his short story in a collection of short stories or his poem
in an anthology of poetry.265
The Supreme Court was untroubled by the possibility that trivial
amounts of copyrightable material could prevent the importation of utilita-
rian objects such as auto parts.266
The lower court may indeed have gone too far in suggesting that the
copyright in the accessory simply disappeared because it “merged” into the
uncopyrighted article that it accompanied. Unlike Australia’s statute, which
requires that the accessory itself be noninfringing, the lower court’s analysis
in Frank & Hirsch could be read as eliminating all copyright protection for
the accessory. Perhaps the Supreme Court read the lower court’s opinion too
broadly; the lower court may have meant to apply its “merger” analysis only
where the accessory itself was noninfringing. Imposing that condition would
answer the Supreme Court’s concern that authors and artists would have no
infringement claim against someone who used their copyrighted work in an
accessory without their consent. It would also have created a judicial excep-
tion that closely paralleled the Australian statute. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court’s broad interpretation of the lower court’s merger analysis led it to
squarely reject that approach, opening the door for trademark owners to
wield copyright law as a broad weapon against parallel imports.
A contemporaneous commentator noted that the principle of Frank &
Hirsch could “be adapted so as to prevent parallel importation of equipment
and all sorts of goods by relying on copyright in labels, get-up, instruction
books and the like” and that while “restraining the importation and dealing
in peripheral items does not necessarily mean that trading in the substantive
items can be prevented . . . in many cases it is not a commercial proposition
to trade in the substantive items if they cannot be accompanied by the pe-
ripheral items in which copyright subsists.”267
Since the Frank & Hirsch decision, South African trademark owners
have brought successful claims of copyright infringement against gray mar-
ket importers of hi-fi equipment, watches and other products, relying on the
copyright in the design drawings on which these three-dimensional articles
265. Id. at 290-91.
266. Id. at 291-92. The Court cited English and Australian case law to support its analy-
sis. Id. at 288, 291 (citing Tavener Rutledge Ltd. v Specters Ltd., [1959] R.P.C. 83 (U.K.);
Moffat & Paige Ltd. v. George Gill & Sons Ltd., [1902] 86 L.T. 465 (U.K.); R & A Bailey &
Co. Ltd. v. Boccaccio (Pty.) Ltd., (1986) 84 FLR 232, 239 (Austl.)). It also noted, however,
that under South Africa’s copyright law knowledge is a prerequisite to liability for infringing
importation and distribution of copyrighted material. Id. at 289 (citing Copyright Act 98 of
1978 § 23 (S. Afr.)). Thus, an importer of utilitarian goods in South Africa would not be liable
for infringing the copyright in an accessory unless it knew that the accessory was copyrighted
and infringing. This would not be true in the United States, where copyright liability for in-
fringing importation or distribution does not depend on the defendant’s knowledge.
267. Owen H. Dean, South Africa—Copyright: Parallel Importation of Artistic Works, 4
ENT. L.R. 99, 101 (1993).
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were based.268  While the lower court had the foresight to predict this conse-
quence, South Africa’s copyright laws simply did not provide it, or the Su-
preme Court, with the legal tools they needed to distinguish between
substantial copyrightable works and mere accessories.
D. Canadian Jurisprudence
Canada’s approach to parallel imports combines weak trademark laws
with strong copyright protection, which creates a “perfect storm” that has
encouraged trademark owners to use copyright law to block parallel imports
of noncopyrightable merchandise. While recent legislation may reduce these
opportunities, much will still be left to court interpretation.
Because Canada’s trademark law is grounded in the traditional common
law concept of passing off,269 it does not provide an exclusive importation
right. In the absence of deliberate deception, trademark owners cannot use
trademark or unfair competition law to block the importation and sale of
goods that were manufactured overseas either by the Canadian trademark
owner or by one of its affiliates or licensees.270 Even where the goods differ
in quality, proper labeling may preclude liability.271 Thus, Canada provides
especially weak protection against parallel imports of trademarked goods.
By contrast, Canada grants copyright owners the exclusive right to im-
port copies of their works for the purpose of sale or other commercial ex-
ploitation.272 In general, an imported copy infringes if it was made without
the consent of the Canadian copyright owner.273 Thus, by assigning the cop-
yright in a work to different assignees in different countries, the Canadian
copyright owner can prevent the importation of foreign-made copies even if
they are not pirated.274 The stark contrast between Canada’s importation
268. Owen Dean, South Africa: The South African Position on Parallel Importing, SPOOR
& FISHER (Apr. 1, 2001), http://www.spoor.com/home/index.php?ipkArticleID=217; see
Coenraad Visser, Importing Grey Goods into South Africa, 1 JUTA’S BUS. L. 187, 187 (1993).
269. See, e.g., Consumers Dist. Co. Ltd. v. Seiko Time Can., [1984] 1 S.C.R. 583 (Can.)
(absent deliberate passing off, authorized retailer could not prevent importer from selling gen-
uine Seiko watches even if not covered by Canada warranty); Trade-Marks Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c-T-13 s 7 (Can.) (prohibiting passing off, misrepresentation, and acts likely to cause confu-
sion between one person’s wares and those of another).
270. See Consumers Dist. Co. Ltd. v. Seiko Time Can., [1984] 1 S.C.R. 583 (Can.); Sony
du Can. Ltée v. Impact Électronique (1991), 39 C.P.R. (3d) 414 (Que. S.C.); Sony du Can.
Ltée v. Multitronic Stéréo Inc. (1991), 42 C.P.R. (3d) 53 (Can. Que C.A.); Nestlé Enters. Ltd.
v. Edan Food Sales Inc. [1991] 1 F.C. 182 (Can.); Sharp Elecs. of Can. Ltd. v. Cont’l Elec.
Info. Inc. (1988), 23 C.P.R. (3d) 330 (B.C.S.C.); see also Teresa Scassa, Using Copyright Law
to Prevent Parallel Importation: A Comment on Kraft Canada, Inc. v Euro-Excellence, Inc.,
85 CAN. B. R. 409 (2006).
271. Nestlé Enters. Ltd., [1991] 1 F.C at 189-90.
272. Copyright Act § 27(2) (Can.).
273. Id.
274. A slight variation on these rules applies specifically to books. The importation of
copyrighted books requires the consent of the Canadian copyright owner whenever there is an
exclusive distributor in Canada, even if the foreign copies were lawfully made by the Canadian
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rules for trademarks and copyrights has encouraged trademark owners to
resort to copyright law in order to reduce competition from imported goods.
In the most notable case to date, Kraft Canada Inc. v. Euro-Excellence
Inc.,275 Canada’s highest court approved this strategy, but in a very splin-
tered opinion.
The defendant, Canadian distributor Euro-Excellence, bought authentic
Toblerone and Cote d’Or chocolate products from a source in Europe and
imported the chocolates into Canada. In addition to Canadian trademark re-
gistrations for TOBLERONE and COTE D’OR, Kraft also had valid copy-
right registrations for several features of the product labels. Adopting the
same reasoning that the Australian courts used in R & A Bailey & Co. Ltd v.
Boccaccio Pty Ltd.,276 which was legislatively overruled by Australia’s Par-
liament,277 the trial court held that importing chocolates with these copy-
righted labels without the consent of the Canadian copyright owner infringed
copyright owner. Copyright Act §§ 27.1(1), (3) (Can.). For a detailed discussion of the ratio-
nale underlying the parallel import rules for books, see CAN. HERITAGE, THE ROLE OF THE
BOOK IMPORTATION REGULATIONS IN CANADA’S MARKET FOR BOOKS (Apr. 2012). Unlike the
general import ban, the import ban for lawfully made books is not limited to foreign copies
that were lawful due to expired copyrights, ineligible subject matter, compulsory licenses, or
the consent of a foreign copyright owner. With respect to books, even if the Canadian copy-
right owner also owns the foreign copyright, and consents to the foreign manufacture, the
unauthorized importation of those copies would still infringe because the importer would have
infringed if it had made the copies in Canada. The importation rule for books, however, is
more liberal than the general importation rule in one respect: The importation of books can
infringe only if it conflicts with the rights of an exclusive distributor. Copyright Act § 27.1(3)
(Can.). Furthermore, infringement claims based on infringing importation or domestic distribu-
tion of imported books can be brought only against defendants that received notice of the
exclusive distribution arrangement before the infringement occurred. Id. §§ 27.1(3), (5).
There is one exception to the special importation right with respect to books. The statu-
tory definition of “books” expressly excludes any “instruction or repair manual that accompa-
nies a product or that is supplied as an accessory to a service.” Id. § 2. As a result, manuals are
subject to the general importation rule rather than the more stringent importation rule for
books. If the manuals are copied overseas with the consent of the Canadian copyright owner,
then they can be imported without the copyright owner’s consent. If, however, the Canadian
and foreign copyrights are owned by different parties, then the Canadian copyright owner can
prevent the importation. In contrast to the rule governing books, the importers of user manuals
can be sued for infringement even if there is no exclusive distribution arrangement. The ratio-
nale for the stricter book importation rules—protecting Canada’s publishing industry—simply
does not apply to user manuals. See CANADIAN HERITAGE, supra note 274, at 4. Thus, the
exemption for manuals only exempts them from the special rule for books; it does not exempt
them from the import ban entirely, and thus it does not create an “accessory” exemption for
user manuals.
275. Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Can. Inc., [2007] S.C.R. 20 (Can.).
276. See supra notes 188-202 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 209-215 and accompanying text.
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Kraft’s Canadian copyrights.278 The Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) upheld
the finding of infringement.279
Kraft had based its infringement claim on Section 27(2)(e) of the Copy-
right Act, under which a copyright owner can prevent the importation of any
copy that would infringe “if it had been made in Canada by the person who
made it,” provided that the purpose of the importation is commercial distri-
bution or exhibition, or any distribution that would prejudice the copyright
owner.280 Where the Canadian and foreign copyrights are owned by different
parties, the unauthorized importation of foreign-made copies will infringe if
the foreign copyright owner has no right to make copies in Canada. In con-
trast, if the Canadian copyright owner directly authorized the foreign copies,
then importation does not infringe, because making those copies in Canada
would not infringe.281
The Euro-Excellence appeal left the Supreme Court deeply divided.282
Five of the nine justices held that the labels were copyright infringement.283
Four justices argued that they should be treated as noninfringing because the
presence of copyrighted material on the candy wrappers was “merely inci-
dental” to the product.284 These justices would have rejected Kraft’s attempt
to use copyright law as an end run around trademark law:
[T]he Copyright Act ought not only to be interpreted with an eye to
the internal coherence of its own scheme; it must also not be inter-
preted in a fashion which is inconsistent with the Trade-marks Act.
Trade-mark law protects market share in commercial goods; copy-
right protects the economic gains resulting from an exercise of skill
and judgment. If trade-mark law does not protect market share in a
278. Kraft Canada Inc. v. Euro Excellence Inc., [2004] 4 F.C.R. 410 (Can.) (Harrington,
J.). The court therefore enjoined the importation of the chocolates. Id. In a subsequent hearing,
the Federal Court clarified that Euro-Excellence could resume importing the chocolate after it
covered up the copyrighted portions of the labels. Kraft Canada Inc. v. Euro Excellence Inc.,
[2005] F.C.R. D 52 (Can.) (Harrington, J.).
279. Kraft Canada Inc. v. Euro Excellence Inc., [2006] 3 F.C.R. 91 (Can.).
280. Copyright Act § 27(2)(e) (Can.).
281. Under this rule, the copyright owner can also block importation of copies made in
countries where the work does not qualify for copyright protection, where its copyright has
expired, or where a compulsory license applies.
282. Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.R. 20 (Can.).
283. The majority ultimately permitted the importation, but on the narrow ground that
Kraft Canada was only a licensee and not the owner of the Canadian copyright. Id. at 22
(Binnie, Deschamps, & Rothstein JJ.). As illustrated in the Frank & Hirsch case in South
Africa, however, a potential plaintiff can overcome this obstacle by obtaining an assignment of
the copyright in the country of importation. Frank & Hirsch (Pty.) Ltd. v A Roopanand Bros.
(Pty.) Ltd., 1993 (4) SA 279 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
284. Euro-Excellence Inc., [2007] S.C.R. 20, ¶¶ 83-95 (Bastarache, LeBel, and Charron,
JJ.); see also id. ¶ 56 (Fish, J.) (expressing “grave doubt whether the law governing the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights in Canada can be transformed in this way into an instrument
of trade control not contemplated by the Copyright Act.”).
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particular situation, the law of copyright should not be used to pro-
vide that protection, if that requires contorting copyright outside its
normal sphere of operation. The protection offered by copyright
cannot be leveraged to include protection of economic interests that
are only tangentially related to the copyrighted work. . . .
. . .
Thus s. 27(2)(e) is meant to protect copyright holders from the un-
authorized importation of works which are the result of their skill
and judgment. It is not meant to protect manufacturers from the un-
authorized importation of consumer goods on the basis of their hav-
ing a copyrighted work affixed to their wrapper, this work being
merely incidental to their value as consumer goods.285
These justices did not adopt a precise definition of “incidental” copy-
rights, and they acknowledged that the determination would not always be
easy.286 Instead, they suggested that what constitutes incidental content
should be determined from the consumer’s perspective:
Some factors which may be useful in making such a determination
could include the nature of the product, the nature of the protected
work and the relationship of the work to the product. If a reasonable
consumer undertaking a commercial transaction does not think that
the copyrighted work is what she is buying or dealing with, it is
likely that the work is merely incidental to the consumer good.
Thus, the sale of a t-shirt with a reproduction of a painting on
its front may constitute the sale of the work (the painting); on the
other hand, the location of a small logo on the corner of a shirt
pocket would not thereby transform an otherwise plain shirt into a
copyrighted work, as the logo qua copyrighted work would be
merely incidental to the shirt being sold (and, as noted above, any
value the logo has as identifying a brand would be protected by
trade-mark law, rather than by copyright). To take a slightly differ-
ent example, a copyrighted instruction booklet included in the box
of some consumer good would, as copyrighted work, be merely in-
cidental to the good for the purposes of s. 27(2).287
The majority rejected this analysis as unsupported by the copyright stat-
utes.288 They acknowledged Australia’s statutory exception for accessories,
285. Id. ¶¶ 83-88 (Bastarache, LeBel, and Charron, JJ.).
286. Id. ¶ 94.
287. Id. ¶¶ 94-95.
288. Id. ¶¶ 3-13 (Binnie, Deschamps, and Rothstein, JJ.); see also id. ¶¶ 111-12
(McLachlin C.J. and Abella J.) (declining to limit copyright protection “based on whether the
logos on the wrapper are “incidental” or whether the copyright holder has a “legitimate eco-
nomic interest”).
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but, like the Supreme Court of South Africa, they did not believe that such
an exception should be judicially created.289
Neither the FCA nor the Supreme Court opinions in Euro-Excellence
had occasion to consider whether copyright might subsist in the shape or
appearance of the chocolates themselves.290 If the authorized manufacturers
of Toblerone or Cote d’Or were to use chocolate molds that produced choco-
lates in copyrightable shapes or embedded with copyrightable text or de-
signs, it would be impossible for a distributor to cover over the copyrighted
material, and Kraft would have an even greater ability to use copyright law
to block importation of otherwise lawful goods.
If Canada had enacted an accessory exception such as those adopted in
Australia and Singapore, then the copyright in the candy wrappers could not
have blocked the importation of the chocolates.291 In order to address more
challenging scenarios where the protectable expression or design is inte-
grated into the product configuration, the courts (or the legislature) would
have to adopt a definition of accessories that, like Australia’s, focuses on
what the putative accessory contributes to the article.
Recent changes in Canadian copyright law, however, may affect the fu-
ture status of parallel imports.  At the time Euro-Excellence was decided,
Canadian copyright owners could bring infringement claims against domes-
tic resellers of unauthorized imports,292 because the imported copies were
treated as infringing.  A first sale defense was not possible because, until
2012, Canada did not formally recognize a “first sale” rule.
Five years after Euro-Excellence, the long-delayed Copyright Moderni-
zation Act of 2012 added Section 3(1)(j) to the copyright statutes, giving
copyright owners the exclusive right,
in the case of a work that is in the form of a tangible object, to sell
or otherwise transfer ownership of the tangible object, as long as
that ownership has never previously been transferred in or outside
Canada with the authorization of the copyright owner.293
289. Id. ¶ 5 (Binnie, Deschamps, and Rothstein, JJ.). The majority ultimately permitted
the importation, but on the narrow ground that Kraft Canada was only a licensee and not the
owner of the Canadian copyright. Id. ¶¶ 49-51. As illustrated in the Frank & Hirsch case, a
potential plaintiff can overcome this obstacle by obtaining an assignment of the copyright in
the country of importation.
290. The Federal Court of Appeal noted that, while the Cote d’Or elephant logo not only
appeared on the candy wrapper but was also “impressed within the COTE D’OR chocolate
itself,” Kraft Canada asserted copyright infringement based only on the wrapper. Kraft Can.
Inc. v. Euro Excellence Inc., [2005] F.C.R. D 52, ¶ 4 (Can.).
291. One commentator has recommended that Canada adopt this approach. Scassa, supra
note 270, at 418-20.
292. Scassa, supra note 270, at 416.
293. Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20 (Can.). At the time Euro-Excellence
was decided, the only provision which directly conferred a public distribution right was Sec-
tion 3(1), which granted authors the exclusive right to publish their unpublished works. Copy-
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Although this provision recognizes an exclusive public distribution
right, it simultaneously restricts that right by creating a rule of exhaustion.294
The new provision on exhaustion codifies for the first time a doctrine
that has not been extensively delineated by the Canadian courts. Canada’s
leading case on copyright exhaustion, Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit
Champlain Inc., establishes only that the owner of a lawful copy of a work
has certain implied rights to use the work.295 It will therefore be up to the
courts to define the precise contours of the newly codified exhaustion rule.
In particular, it is unclear how the new exhaustion rule relates to the
exclusive importation right. Does the exhaustion of the distribution right
also exhaust the importation right, as in Kirtsaeng? And if the work has
different copyright owners in Canada and abroad, does a foreign owner’s
authorization of a foreign transfer exhaust the distribution right in Canada,
as it does in Singapore? The language of the amendment implies that ex-
haustion will not be triggered by unauthorized distributions, such as those
which take place in countries where the work does not enjoy copyright pro-
tection or is subject to a compulsory license or other limitation on the au-
thor’s exclusive rights.  Beyond this, the statute leaves much room for
judicial interpretation. Because Canada has recently joined the TPP negotia-
right Act § 3(1) (Can.). Because Section 2 defined “publication” as “making copies of a work
available to the public[,]” id. § 2.2(1)(a)(i),it is not clear why these existing provisions were
considered insufficient recognition of the exclusive distribution right. The most likely possibil-
ity is that the first authorized public distribution of copies of a work extinguished the Section
3(1) publication right, because the work was no longer “unpublished.” While Section 27(2) of
the Copyright Act recognized the unauthorized distribution of infringing copies as a form of
secondary infringement, liability required proof that the distributor knew or should have
known that the copies were infringing. See MACGILLIVRAY, supra note 3, at 97-98. The new
publication right will allow copyright owners to bring infringement claims against distributors
of infringing copies even after the underlying work has been published, and without proof of
knowledge. Because the new right is limited by a rule of exhaustion, copyright owners will not
be able to prevent resales of authorized copies. Although one commentator has suggested
various alarming implications of Section 3(1)(j), the statutory language does not support these
interpretations. See Section 3(i)(j) of the New Copyright Act – Good or Bad?, MINCOV L.
CORP., http://mincovlaw.com/blog-post/section_3(1)(j)_of_the_new_copyright_act_-_good_
or_bad (suggesting that the new rule requires the copyright owner’s consent for resales of
tangible copies, and gives the author ownership of a computer or other tangible medium that
she borrows to compose her work).
294. According to Balanced Copyright, the Canadian government’s official website on
the new legislation, Section 3(1)(j) was intended to “enable a copyright holder to control the
first sale of every copy of their work.” Questions and Answers: The Copyright Modernization
Act, BALANCED COPYRIGHT, http://www.balancedcopyright.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-prda.nsf/eng/h_r
p01153.html#amend (last visited August 3, 2013).
295. Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] S.C.R. 336 (Can.) (stat-
ing that owner of a lawfully produced copy had the right to use that copy, including transfer-
ring the ink from poster to canvas); see Jeremy de Beer & Robert Tomkowicz, Exhaustion of
Intellectual Property Rights in Canada, 25 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 3, 12-13 (2009); MAC-
GILLIVRAY, supra note 3, at 104 (suggesting that the Théberge analysis might not apply to
parallel imports).
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tions, it has implicitly signaled its intention to preserve the exclusive impor-
tation rights of copyright owners.  Will it still be able to do so under the new
exhaustion regime? Like the United States, Canada will have to find a way
to reconcile the TPP position with its new principle of exhaustion.
When Section 3(1)(j) was first proposed, the government’s official com-
mentary stated that “the distribution right would no longer be operative once
the first ownership of that tangible copy has been transferred with the au-
thorization of the copyright owner, by sale or otherwise, inside or outside
Canada (i.e., consistent with ‘international exhaustion’).”296 Therefore, if
copyrighted items are manufactured outside of Canada and then sold “with
the consent of the copyright owner,” under the new rule the copyright owner
will no longer have the exclusive right to “transfer ownership” of those
copies.
The right to transfer ownership of copies, however, is not necessarily the
same thing as the right to import copies. Even if copyright owners cannot
prevent resales of lawful copies, they might still be able to prevent the im-
portation of such copies under Section 27(2)(e). This interpretation would
enable Canada to comply with the TPP. On the other hand, the fact that
Section 3(1)(j) expressly states that a foreign transfer of ownership will ex-
haust the author’s distribution right could imply that the importation right is
also exhausted. If Section 3(1)(j) allows foreign purchasers to resell their
copies in Canada, then it can be argued that it also permits them to transport
those copies to Canada before doing so.
This analytical problem invites comparison to the first sale rule of the
United States.297 As noted earlier,298 the Supreme Court held in Quality
King299 that the Section 602(a) importation right is a subset of the Section
106(3) public distribution right rather than an entirely separate right; there-
fore, the first sale exception to the distribution right is also an exception to
the importation right.300 Kirtsaeng reaffirmed this interpretation.301 The lan-
guage of Section 602(a)(1) differs from the Canadian provisions, however,
because it expressly provides that unauthorized importation “is an infringe-
296. According to Michael Geist, who posted the document on his blog, the government
prepared this clause by clause commentary. Using the example of a book, the commentary
states (at page 607 of the untitled document) that “once ownership of that copy of that book
has been transferred by the copyright owner, wherever in the world, the right is ‘exhausted’ or
terminated with respect to that particular copy of the book.” Behind the Scenes of Bill C-32:
Govt’s Clause-By-Clause Analysis Raises Constitutional Questions, MICHAEL GEIST (Sept. 27,
2011), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/6026/125/.
297. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
298. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
299. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
300. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 149-51. As noted earlier, see supra notes 98-99 and ac-
companying text, Quality King concluded that the first sale rule applies only to copies made in
the United States, the position later rejected by Kirtsaeng.
301. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1368 (2013).
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ment of the exclusive right to distribute . . . under section 106.”302  In con-
trast, Canada’s copyright statutes treat the importation and distribution rights
separately, and contain no language suggesting that one right is subsumed
within the other.303 Therefore, a court could rule that Section 3(1)(j) does not
override the importation ban.
However, Quality King also gave a second reason for treating importa-
tion as a sale or other disposition. When goods are imported, there is usually
a transfer of ownership as well: “An ordinary interpretation of the statement
that a person is entitled ‘to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession’ of an
item surely includes the right to ship it to another person in another coun-
try.”304 Thus, even if the Canadian statutes do not expressly treat importation
as a form of distribution, the Quality King analysis suggests that Section
3(1)(j) might permit importation for the purpose of carrying out the sale, just
as Théberge’s analysis suggests that it might permit importation after the
sale has taken place.
Another ambiguity in Section 3(1)(j) arises from the requirement that
the previous sale or transfer that triggers exhaustion must have taken place
with the “authorization of the copyright owner.” The Copyright Act does not
define “copyright owner.” In the case of imported copies, this phrase could
refer either to (1) the copyright owner in the country where the first transfer
occurred, or (2) the Canadian copyright owner.305
If the reference is to the Canadian copyright owner, then a copyright
owner can continue to prevent importation and resale of foreign-made copies
if it assigns the work’s Canadian and foreign copyrights to different owners
(for example, corporate affiliates or exclusive distributors). This outcome
would allow Kraft to continue to block chocolate imports by assigning the
Canadian copyright in the labels to one party, and the copyright in the labels
in the country of manufacture to a different entity.
In contrast, if the reference is to the copyright owner in the country
where the first transfer occurred, so that exhaustion is triggered even when a
foreign copyright owner authorizes the sale of copies, then Section 3(1)(j)
implements a much broader rule of international exhaustion. Under the
broader rule, Canadian copyright owners will be able to prevent importation
of lawfully made copies only when they were made in countries where the
302. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1).
303. The distribution right is addressed in Copyright Act §§ 3(1)(j), 27(1), 27(2)(b)-(c),
27.1(2) (Can.). The importation right is addressed in id. §§ 27(2)(e), 27.1(1).
304. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 1134.
305. The statutes themselves provide no clear answer. Section 27(1) implies that the
phrase refers to the Canadian copyright owner: “It is an infringement of copyright for any
person to do, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, anything that by this Act only
the owner of the copyright has the right to do.” Copyright Act § 27(1) (Can.). In setting forth
the importation rule for books, however, § 27.1 distinguishes between “the owner of the copy-
right . . . in the country where the copies were made” and “the owner of the copyright . . . in
Canada.” Id. § 27.1.
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work had no copyright protection or where the copying was permitted by a
compulsory license.
III. CRAFTING A DOMESTIC SOLUTION
As illustrated above, the overlap of copyright and trademark laws in a
number of countries has made it difficult to enforce different parallel import
policies for each intellectual property regime. In the United States prior to
Kirtsaeng, imports that were permissible under trademark law could become
impermissible if even a trivial component was protected by copyright. This
state of affairs may return if Congress overturns Kirtsaeng, in whole or in
part, in order to satisfy the copyright industries and comply with existing
free trade agreements and the prospective TPP. Even if Congress leaves
Kirtsaeng intact, some trademark owners may still be able to use incidental
copyrighted components to block parallel imports by outsourcing their man-
ufacturing while retaining title in the copies.306 Others may rely on ornamen-
tal designs—such as the design Omega used on its watches—that can be
protected by design patents.
If Congress leaves Kirtsaeng untouched, trademark law may actually
provide stronger protection than copyright law against parallel imports.
American publishers can merely make modest changes in their foreign edi-
tions in order to differentiate them from American editions. Given the pro-
pensity of federal courts to treat even minor variations in gray market goods
as “material differences” for purposes of the Lanham Act,307 a publisher
might thus succeed in suing unauthorized importers and resellers of its for-
eign editions for infringement of its trademark even if it could not sue them
for copyright infringement because of Kirtsaeng.
It may be time to question whether the United States should simply
abandon the use of different parallel import rules for different intellectual
property regimes, and instead follow the examples of the European Union
and Japan by harmonizing the importation rules across regimes. Under a
harmonized approach, trademark owners would no longer have an incentive
to “wag the dog” by using incidental features protected by copyright or pat-
ent law in order to accomplish what trademark law cannot. Such a proposal
requires a careful consideration of the policies that underlie each of these
regimes. Whereas trademark law focuses primarily on protecting consumers
from confusion as the source of goods, copyright and patent law provide
financial incentives in the form of limited monopolies in order to encourage
creative efforts. These monopolies will better reward authors and inventors
by allowing them to maximize the value of their exclusive rights through
control of parallel imports.
306. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
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This analysis is oversimplified, however, because trademark law also
recognizes that strong trademark protection can encourage trademark owners
to invest in their goodwill and police their marks against confusing uses.
Likewise, giving too great a monopoly to copyright and patent owners can
affect the supply and price of goods, to the detriment of the public interest.
Thus, the larger question of whether parallel import rules can or should be
harmonized is beyond the scope of this paper. For now, the focus should be
on ensuring that each of these parallel import regimes is able to fulfill its
policy goals without interference or manipulation. Whatever the outcome of
this next round of copyright reform in the United States, trademark owners
should not be allowed to use copyright or patent laws to create an end run
around the trademark and competition policies established by the Lanham
Act and the 1930 Tariff Act.308  As discussed below, familiar doctrines such
as fair use, implied license, and copyright or patent misuse may be helpful in
some cases, but a statutory solution will be more comprehensive and more
efficient, and will provide greater certainty. A narrowly tailored exception to
the copyright and design patent statutes would preserve the balance of rights
established under federal trademark law.  The remainder of this article ex-
plores these options.
A. Application of Existing Doctrines
Courts could intervene on a case-by-case basis by construing existing
copyright and design patent laws in a manner that prevents their application
to incidental uses such as labels. Three doctrines that might serve this pur-
pose are (1) copyright (or patent) misuse, (2) de minimis infringement, and
(3) (for copyright only) fair use. Each of these doctrines provides a less than
satisfactory solution, however.
1. Misuse
Courts could find that attempts to use copyright or design patent protec-
tion to block otherwise-lawful imports constitute copyright or patent mis-
308. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected attempts to use one intellectual prop-
erty regime to achieve results that undermine the policies underlying another. For example, in
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 540 U.S. 23 (2003), the Supreme Court
struck down what it perceived as an attempt to create “mutant copyright law” by using the
Lanham Act as an end run around federal copyright policy. See also Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (holding that federal patent law preempted
state law prohibiting certain methods of copying of boat hull designs); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (holding that state law unfair competition claims for in-
fringement of unpatentable lamp design were preempted by federal patent law); Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (similar). Lower courts have also expressed
concern that plaintiffs may assert trivial copyright infringement claims in order to achieve
anticompetitive goals. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson
Pharm., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 29(2d Cir. 2000) (dismissing drug maker’s claim that a generic
competitor infringed copyright in its label).
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use.309 The possibility that a court will find misuse could deter overreaching
by trademark owners, because such a finding renders the asserted copyright
or patent unenforceable for so long as the misuse continues.310
The misuse defense generally applies where a patent or copyright owner
attempts to leverage its limited monopoly to exercise control over goods or
services outside the scope of that monopoly.311 Early case law applied the
misuse doctrine only where the patent or copyright owners had employed
tying arrangements312 or restrictive licensing provisions.313 While Congress
has restricted the scope of patent misuse by amending the patent statutes,314
recent case law has confirmed the broad scope of copyright misuse. In As-
sessment Technologies LLC v. Wire Data, Inc.,315 the Seventh Circuit held
that a copyright owner’s use of an infringement suit to secure property pro-
tection for uncopyrightable information was “an abuse of process.” The
Fourth Circuit has described copyright misuse broadly as the use of copy-
right “in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of
copyright.”316
In the parallel import context, when the Central District of California
considered Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega on remand, it held that Omega
could not prevail in its copyright infringement claim because it had engaged
in copyright misuse.317 Under Ninth Circuit law, the copyright misuse de-
fense “prevents copyright holders from leveraging their limited monopoly to
allow them to control areas outside of their monopoly.”318 When Omega
applied the copyrighted design to the back of its uncopyrightable watches for
the purpose of blocking their importation and resale, “Omega misused its
309. The leading cases recognizing the misuse doctrine are Morton Salt Co. v. G. S.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (patent misuse) and Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911
F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990) (copyright misuse). Morton Salt involved utility patents. No case thus
far has considered whether the misuse doctrine applies to design patents, but there is no reason
why the same principles would not apply.
310. See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957); Lasercomb,
911 F.2d at 979, 979 n.22.
311. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001).
312. In a tying arrangement, a patent or copyright owner conditions a sale or lease of
goods, or the grant of an intellectual property license, on the purchase or license of other
property that is not protected by the patent or copyright. Such arrangements constitute misuse
if they extend the patent or copyright monopoly beyond its lawful scope. For example, the
patentee in Morton Salt leased its patented machines only on the condition that the lessee
purchase unpatented salt tablets exclusively from the patentee. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 491.
313. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2011 WL 8492716, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
9, 2011).
314. 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4676 (adding 35
U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5)).
315. Assessment Techs. LLC v. Wire Data, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003).
316. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990).
317. Omega, 2011 WL 8492716 at *2.
318. Id. at *1 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
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copyright of the Omega Globe Design by leveraging its limited monopoly in
being able to control the importation of that design to control the importation
of its Seamaster watches.”319 While the court clearly found it significant that
blocking parallel imports was “one purpose” of adding the design to the
watch,320 it is not clear what act the court believed constituted the misuse—
bringing the infringement suit, or placing the design on the watches in the
first place.
The district court’s misuse analysis seems to have been strongly influ-
enced by its belief that Omega’s purpose in embedding the copyrighted de-
sign was to achieve a degree of control over the distribution of
uncopyrightable merchandise that it could not achieve through trademark
law. When Omega argued that the design had other purposes as well—to
promote the creativity and aesthetics of the design and to increase the value
of the watch—the court largely ignored these arguments, noting only that
“those aspects of the design are protected by its copyright and are not a
defense to copyright misuse.”321 If Omega’s paper trail had not indicated so
clearly that these arguments were specious, the court might have been
obliged to take them more seriously.
In a later proceeding awarding attorneys fees to Costco, the Central Dis-
trict of California described Omega’s infringement claim as “improperly
motivated” and as “arguably unreasonable and frivolous.”322 The court still
did not clarify the precise act that constituted copyright misuse. Nonetheless,
it asserted that Omega should have known that it was committing misuse:
While one segment of Omega’s claim raised issues sufficiently am-
biguous to split the Supreme Court, the claim as a whole was clearly
not one properly raised under copyright law. As the Supreme Court
has explained, “copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of en-
riching the general public through access to creative works. . . .” By
affixing a barely perceptible copyrighted design to the back of some
of its watches, Omega did not provide—and did not seek to pro-
vide—creative works to the general public. Omega sought to exert
control over its watches, control which it believed it could not oth-
erwise exert. Thus, even though the defense of copyright misuse
may not have been articulated in a way that explicitly and directly
prohibited Omega’s particular actions, it should have been clear to
319. Id. at *2.
320. Id. For criticism of the district court’s application of the misuse doctrine, see Panko,
supra note 4, at 22.
321. Omega, 2011 WL 8492716 at *2.
322. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2012 WL 3150432, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June
20, 2012) (citing Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994)).
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Omega that its actions were not condoned or protected by copyright
law.323
Other federal courts have yet to consider whether the misuse doctrine
applies to the use of incidental intellectual property rights to block parallel
imports.324 While some might be willing to find copyright or patent misuse
when presented with particularly strong evidence that the plaintiff added the
copyrighted or patented component with the intent to block lawful imports,
it is unlikely that this approach will solve the broader problem. In many
cases, there may be little or no evidence of the reason why the text or design
feature was used. If courts prove willing to find misuse on facts similar to
Costco, companies will probably continue to use Omega’s strategy while
exercising greater care not to leave incriminating paper trails.
In addition, potential defendants may be reluctant to rely on the copy-
right misuse doctrine due to its uncertain scope. Patent and copyright misuse
are judicially created doctrines, which lack precise boundaries,325 and courts
apply them cautiously, on a case-by-case basis.326 Because misuse is an af-
firmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of proof.327 In contrast to
323. Id.
324. In his minority opinion in Euro-Excellence, Justice Fish of the Canadian Supreme
Court noted in passing the possible relevance of copyright misuse, a doctrine not yet recog-
nized in Canada. Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.R. 20, ¶ 98 (Can.).
325. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1942); Lasercomb
Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990). The 1988 Patent Misuse Reform
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4676 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5)) narrowed but
did not eliminate the patent misuse defense. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976, 976 n.15. While at
one time a finding of misuse was thought to require an antitrust violation, that is no longer the
case. Id. at 977-78, 977 n.17. One commentator describes patent misuse as “an elusive doc-
trine,” Marshall Leaffer, Patent Misuse and Innovation, 10 J. HIGH TECH. L. 142, 148 (2010),
and one that is “based on vague principles that overlap antitrust law,” Marshall Leaffer, Engi-
neering Competitive Policy and Copyright Misuse, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1087, 1101 (1994).
For more on the uncertain scope of patent misuse, see Vincent Chiappetta, Living with Patents:
Insights from Patent Misuse, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2011); Thomas F. Cotter,
Four Questionable Rationales for the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 12 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.
457 (2011). For detailed explorations of copyright misuse, see John T. Cross & Peter K. Yu,
Competition Law and Copyright Misuse, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 427 (2008); Kathryn Judge, Re-
thinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2004); Symposium, Codifying Copyright’s
Misuse Defense, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 573 (2007).
326. The Supreme Court has not explicitly endorsed the concept of copyright misuse,
although it has recognized that certain activities by copyright owners-e.g., tying arrangements-
can violate antitrust laws. U.S. v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 51-52 (1962). Although courts
have provided general definitions of patent and copyright misuse, there is no finite list of
activities that qualify. See Cross & Yu, supra note 325 (analyzing different approaches to
copyright misuse); Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Mis-
use, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 443 (2003) (noting conflicting results produced by applying differ-
ent tests courts have developed for patent misuse).
327. Banco Popular De P.R. v. Asociación De Compositores Y Editores De Música Lati-
noamericana, 678 F.3d 102, 111 (1st Cir. 2012); Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Com’n, 342 F.3d
1361, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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recent successes, copyright misuse claims in the past have rarely suc-
ceeded.328 As is the case with the fair use defense in copyright law, the risk
and uncertainty of raising a misuse defense can have a chilling effect on
potential defendants; in the context of commercial activity, this chilling ef-
fect can impede competition. Without a clear sense of what constitutes a
valid defense of copyright misuse, potential importers and resellers may be
unwilling to undertake activities that could lead to liability.
Without clear statutory authority, courts are likely to resist classifying
an entire category of copyright enforcement efforts as misuse. The decisions
of the highest courts in South Africa and Canada illustrate this reluctance to
carve out large nonstatutory exemptions from copyright protection, even if
the policy argument is compelling.329 After all, copyrightable works accom-
panying or embedded in uncopyrightable merchandise may serve significant
purposes other than providing the basis for infringement claims against par-
allel imports. Aesthetic considerations aimed at enticing consumers may in-
fluence the design of copyrightable labels or packaging, or the copyrightable
elements in the appearance of the product itself. Copyright may also subsist
in owner’s manuals, instructions as to assembly or use, or warranty informa-
tion, all of which serve important informational purposes. The substantiality
of copyright in a software manual, for example, is implicitly recognized in
the Singapore accessories statute.330 A defense of copyright misuse is un-
likely to succeed in these circumstances.
Because copyright misuse is addressed on a case-by-case basis, it would
be costly for individual importers and resellers to pursue this as an affirma-
tive defense. This, combined with the uncertain outcome in any given case,
will discourage them from relying on the defense, effectively allowing copy-
right owners to continue using copyright law to block parallel imports that
are permissible under trademark law.
There is an additional problem with applying misuse in the context of
parallel imports. Ordinarily, misuse ceases when the overreaching conduct
ends—for example, where a company strikes the offending clause from its
licensing agreements.331 Only then does the copyright become enforceable
again. This rule is easy to apply when misuse claims arise from contractual
arrangements such as tying arrangements and price fixing; the misuse ends
when the copyright owner removes the offending clause from its contracts,
or stops demanding that its customers buy or license the tied goods or ser-
328. Leaffer, supra note 325, at 1102.
329. See supra notes 268-269, 292-293 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
331. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465, 474 (1957); Morton Salt
Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1942); B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S.
495, 498 (1942); White Cap Co. v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co., 203 F.2d 694, 698 (6th Cir. 1953);
Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff’d in part & rev’d in
part, 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1971).
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vices.332 But it is more difficult to apply the cessation concept in the parallel
import context. Which activity constitutes the misuse? Is it the trademark
owner’s decision to use protectable text or designs for the purpose of dis-
couraging parallel imports? Or is it the filing of the copyright or patent in-
fringement claim? As noted earlier, the district court in Costco Wholesale
did not answer this question.
Yet identifying the act that constitutes misuse is essential to determining
when the misuse has ended, so that the copyright can become enforceable
again. In order for the misuse to cease, should the copyright (or design pat-
ent) owner execute a covenant not to sue a specific defendant? Must it stop
using the protected content on its products? Must it dedicate the content to
the public domain? The difficulty of applying the cessation concept in the
parallel imports context suggests that the misuse concept itself is a not a
good fit. In the case of design patents, the mere assertion of an infringement
claim cannot, as a matter of statute, provide the basis for a misuse defense.333
A strong argument can be made for applying the same rule to copyright
misuse.
For these reasons, the misuse doctrine is ill suited to distinguishing le-
gitimate copyright and design patent infringement claims from overreaching
claims in the context of parallel imports. At best, it can serve as a temporary
stopgap until Congress clarifies the rules for copyright exhaustion.
2. De Minimis Use
As an alternative to labeling an infringement claim as copyright or pat-
ent misuse, courts might reject an infringement claim on the ground that the
defendant’s use is de minimis. As discussed below, such an argument would
almost certainly fail in the context of design patents, but it has a small pros-
pect for success with respect to copyrights.
Although the patent law concept of de minimis use (also known as ex-
perimental use) is not well developed,334 it is generally understood to be
332. The Third Circuit declined to extend the doctrine to a copyright license that re-
stricted criticism of the licensed work. Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc.,
342 F.3d 191, 203-06 (3d Cir. 2003).
333. Section 271(d) provides, in relevant part:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory in-
fringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the
following:
(3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory
infringement . . .
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012).
334. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Infigen, Inc. v.
Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 981 (W.D. Wis. 1999).
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extremely narrow,335 encompassing only noncommercial experimentation.336
It does not apply at all to commercial activities.337 Even university teaching
and research is not considered de minimis use.338 Therefore, the de minimis
concept in patent law cannot protect those who import patented goods for
the purpose of commercial distribution, even if the design protected by a
patent is a relatively insignificant part of the imported product.
While the cases are not numerous, copyright infringement defendants
have occasionally prevailed by invoking the de minimis concept.339 The rea-
son for the relative dearth of case law appears to be that if an activity is
trivial enough to satisfy the legal standard for a de minimis copyright use, it
rarely leads to litigation.340 The “de minimis” concept in copyright law is not
335. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1361; Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 5-16
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[1][c] (2013), available at LexisNexis.
336. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C. D. Mass. 1813) (building “a
machine merely for philosophical experiments” or to determine its efficacy, should not consti-
tute infringement); 3 WILLIAM ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS
§ 898 (1890) (“[W]here [an invention] is made or used as an experiment, whether for the
gratification of scientific tastes, or for curiosity, or for amusement, the interests of the patentee
are not antagonized, the sole effect being of an intellectual character in the promotion of the
employer’s knowledge or the relaxation afforded to his mind.”). The experimental use excep-
tion that is codified in the patent statutes, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e), is different from the judicially
created doctrine, and would not apply to parallel imports.
337. Spray Refrigeration Co. v. Sea Spray Fishing, Inc., 322 F.2d 34, 36 (9th Cir. 1963);
15-6 CHISUM, supra note 335, § 16.03[1][c]; see 3 ROBINSON, supra note 336, § 898 (noting
that sales and other commercial uses of a patent are always infringements).
338. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362; 15-6 CHISUM, supra note 335, E404 16.03[1][c].
339. Those cases include: Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004)
(affirming district court’s finding that amount of musical composition copied was quantita-
tively and qualitatively so small that audience “would not discern [the plaintiff’s] hand as
composer”); Gordon v. Nextel Commc’ns., 345 F.3d 922, 924-25 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming
district court’s finding of de minimis use where plaintiff’s work appeared for only a few
seconds in a film and was out of focus); Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215,
218 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding plaintiff’s photographs not visible in sufficient detail for average
lay observer to discern either subject matter or style); Computer Ass’ns. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai,
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 715 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting
Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983) in finding no infringement even though “a few” ele-
ments of plaintiff’s software had been copied); See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir.
1983) (finding similarities between plays not sufficient to establish substantial similarity);
MiTek Holdings v. Arce Eng’g Co., 864 F. Supp. 1568, 1584 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that
the elements copied from plaintiff’s software were de minimis), aff’d, 89 F.3d 1548, 1560
(11th Cir. 1996); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 623-24 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (holding that copying of four protectable elements from plaintiff’s software was de
minimis), aff’d in part, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994). See generally 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.01 (2013); Id. § 13.03[A][2]; Id. §§ 8.01,
13.03[A][2]. In a much-criticized decision, the Sixth Circuit held that the de minimis defense
does not apply at all to the infringement of sound recordings. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimen-
sion Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
340. See Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Under-
standably, fact patterns are rarely litigated illustrating this use of the phrase, for, as Judge
Leval has observed, such circumstances would usually involve ‘[q]uestions that never need to
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an affirmative defense. Instead, it reflects a determination that the defen-
dant’s use of the work was so minimal that there is no substantial similarity
as a matter of law, and thus no prima facie case of infringement.341
The de minimis concept in copyright law is normally limited to cases
where the defendant exploits only a small portion of a copyrighted work,342
or where the work is only minimally observable.343 Although other courts
have not adopted his perspective, Judge Leval has advocated for a broader
concept of de minimis use:
Parents in Central Park photograph their children perched on Jose
de Creeft’s Alice in Wonderland sculpture. We record television
programs aired while we are out, so as to watch them at a more
convenient hour. Waiters at a restaurant sing “Happy Birthday” at a
patron’s table. When we do such things, it is not that we are break-
ing the law but unlikely to be sued given the high cost of litigation.
Because of the de minimis doctrine, in trivial instances of copying,
we are in fact not breaking the law. If a copyright owner were to sue
the makers of trivial copies, judgment would be for the defendants.
The case would be dismissed because trivial copying is not an
infringement.344
In addition, the copyright cases finding de minimis use involved in-
fringement by copying, whereas parallel importation cases involve infringe-
ment by public distribution because the copies themselves were lawfully
made. Thus, it would take a significant reconception of de minimis infringe-
ment to apply it to situations such as parallel importation, where the copy-
righted work (e.g., a logo, label, or instruction manual) has been used in its
entirety, and where the unauthorized distribution involves large numbers of
copies. Courts would have to focus not on the amount of material copied, or
the brevity with which it can be perceived, or the number of copies distrib-
be answered.’”) (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1449, 1457 (1997)).
341. Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ASP Consulting LLC, 560 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009);
Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1306-07 (11th
Cir. 2008); Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2004); Gordon v. Nextel
Commc’ns., 345 F.3d 922, 924 (6th Cir. 2003); Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74-75.
342. E.g., Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983);
Jackson v. Washington Monthly Co., 481 F. Supp. 647, 650 (D.D.C. 1979); Alexandria Draft-
ing Co. v. Amsterdam, 43 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1247, 1254 (E.D. Pa. 1997); see also Situation
Mgmt. 560 F.3d at 59, 59 n.2 (acknowledging doctrine but finding it inapplicable to the copy-
ing at issue).
343. E.g., Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 75-77 (finding substantial similarity where a poster on
the set of a television program was clearly visible for 4-5 seconds in one segment, and for a
total of 26-27 seconds in 9 segments, but acknowledging that a visual work might be “filmed
at such a distance and so out of focus that a typical program viewer would not discern any
decorative effect.”).
344. Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001).
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uted—since all of these factors would favor the plaintiff—but on the value
of the copied material in comparison to the value of the uncopyrighted mer-
chandise incorporating the copyrighted material.
Yet this runs counter to the Supreme Court’s admonition that “a taking
may not be excused merely because it is insubstantial with respect to the
infringing work.”345 Courts might also consider the degree of harm suffered
by the copyright owner. But in evaluating this harm courts would have to
consider only the harm arising from the distribution of the copyrighted mate-
rial, not the harm arising from the distribution of the trademarked merchan-
dise. It is conceivable that courts could develop a multifactor approach that
would take account of the relative values of the copyrighted material and the
uncopyrighted merchandise, and the harm to the copyright owner arising
solely from the distribution of the copyrighted material. Expert opinions
would no doubt play a significant role in assessing values and the degree of
harm.
Like the copyright misuse approach, a de minimis approach that relies
on a balancing test could lead to costly litigation, and might not provide
enough predictability for risk-averse importers and distributors.
For these reasons, the de minimis doctrines in patent and copyright law
will, in their current formulations, be difficult to apply to a commercial ac-
tivity involving large-scale importation and public distribution. As discussed
in Part III.B below, however, the broader concept of a de minimis use may
be helpful in creating a statutory exception for accessories.
3. Fair Use
In copyright law, a use that is too substantial to be de minimis may
nevertheless be a fair use.346 Because the Supreme Court views fair use as an
affirmative defense,347 the defendant bears the burden of proof.348 Fair use
always requires a fact-specific case-by-case analysis.349 Because a fair use
defense is costly350 and the prospects of success are difficult to predict,351 it
345. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985) (citing
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.) (“[N]o
plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.”)).
346. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (establishing the elements of fair use); Peter Letterese, 533
F.3d at 1314 n.30; Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 80 (noting that copying which is too substantial to be
de minimis may still qualify as fair use). To date, the most definitive analysis of the elements
of fair use is in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
347. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561.
348. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177; Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164,
1170 (9th Cir. 2012).
349. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 595 n.19.
350. A fair use defense can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. Lawrence Lessig,
Copyrighting the President, WIRED (Aug. 2004), http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.08/
view.html?pg=5.
351. Two cases with similar facts can have opposite outcomes. Compare Ringgold 126
F.3d 70 (holding artwork in background of television show was not fair use), with Jackson v.
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is not likely to provide a viable solution to the problem of incidental use. In
addition, there is no fair use counterpart in in patent law.
A brief look at the statutory fair use factors352 reveals that the unautho-
rized importation and resale of merchandise that incorporates copyrighted
material is unlikely to fare well under the fair use analysis, even where the
copyrighted material is a minor component of the merchandise:
The purpose and character of the use is commercial and nontransforma-
tive. The importer seeks commercial gain, and does not alter the work or
provide any new creative works to the public. Importation for resale does not
involve any of the preferred activities specifically listed in Section 107’s
preamble—criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or re-
search.353 Nor does it constitute personal use.
The nature of the copyrighted work will vary considerably depending on
the individual case. Works such as ingredients lists, instructions, warranty
information, and simple logos may have weak copyrights, because they con-
tain little creative expression or are predominantly factual.354 Other works,
however, may be considered closer to the core of copyrightable expression,
and thus deserving of greater protection.355 The latter category could encom-
pass decorative packaging designs or elaborate logos. Because of the wide
spectrum of possibilities, this factor could lead to widely varying outcomes,
depending on the creativity of the incidental content. In addition, even if a
copyrightable work is highly creative, the value that a single copy of that
work contributes to the imported article that it accompanies might be trivial
relative to the total value of the imported article. For example, a computer
may be packaged in a cardboard box with a colorful design. While the de-
sign may be highly creative, and its copyright might be valuable, the value
of the attractive cardboard box is trivial compared to the value of the com-
puter. Indeed, the consumer will probably discard the box.
The amount taken in a parallel importation case is the entire work. Al-
though this is not necessarily fatal to a fair use defense, it makes a finding of
fair use unlikely absent a strong showing under several of the other
factors.356
The effect on the market for the copyrighted work is one of market sub-
stitution. When the copyrighted items are imported, their resale will displace
Warner Bros., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that artwork in background
of motion picture was fair use).
352. The statutory fair use factors are: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
353. Id. § 107.
354. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
355. Id.
356. Kelly v. Ariba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003).
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sales of copies that were made with the consent of the domestic copyright
owner. This displacement effect normally militates against fair use.357
Thus, in almost any case involving unauthorized importation of copy-
righted works, three of the four fair use factors will favor the copyright
owner, and the fourth—the nature of the copyrighted work—will vary with
the facts. Even where the fourth factor favors the unauthorized importer, it is
unlikely to overcome the strong showing that the copyright owner makes
under the other three factors.
For these reasons, the fair use doctrine is unlikely to prevent trademark
owners from using copyright law to block parallel imports.
B. Specific Legislation
Because existing legal doctrines are ill-suited to distinguishing between
substantial and incidental uses of copyrighted and patented material in paral-
lel imports, a better solution is to adopt legislation that exempts incidental
uses of intellectual property from the otherwise-applicable import restric-
tions imposed by copyright and patent law. In place of expensive case-by-
case adjudication that strains the meaning of established legal concepts,
Congress can specify when the intellectual content associated with a product
is so incidental to the product that it should be disregarded in the context of
enforcing intellectual property rights in parallel imports.
Although both Australia and Singapore adopted their legislative carve-
outs for incidental uses in the context of liberalizing their overall approaches
to parallel imports, there is no reason why such a carve-out could not be
created independently, while otherwise preserving the importation rights of
copyright and design patent owners. A narrowly tailored statutory exception
would restore the balance of rights established under trademark law and the
Tariff Act, without injecting uncertainty into the application of copyright
and patent laws, and without distorting the meaning of existing exceptions.
As illustrated by the Australian cases, a statutory exemption for incidental
uses will not eliminate all questions of statutory interpretation. The range of
uncertainty, however, will be much narrower than the uncertainty created by
applying the concepts of copyright and patent misuse, de minimis infringe-
ment, or fair use.
While the carve-outs in Singapore and Australia apply only in the con-
text of copyright laws, it may be appropriate to draft a comparable exception
to design patent laws.358 Like a copyright, a patented design may or may not
represent a significant part of the value of a product. Where the design pat-
ent protects only a logo on the surface of the product or its packaging, the
357. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.
358. Unless and until there is evidence that trademark owners are leveraging utility pat-
ents to enhance their trademark rights—which is likely to be a rare occurrence—there is no
need to enact a comparable carve-out in this area.
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ornamental aspect of this design will typically represent only a small part of
the value of the utilitarian article. In other cases, a patented design may be
an essential feature because it significantly affects the aesthetic appeal of the
product or makes the product aesthetically compatible with the context in
which it is used. For example, aesthetic design is crucial to the value of
exterior motor vehicle components such as doors, bumpers, seats, steering
wheels, stick shifts, mirrors, fenders, or grills, because it is important for
replacement parts to match the rest of the vehicle’s design.359 In the case of
products where it is not essential to match the design of existing compo-
nents, some aesthetic features are more important to consumers than others.
The color and shape of a coffee maker is likely to be more important than
the color and shape of the manufacturer’s logo.
Import exceptions for incidental copyrights and patented designs may
lead manufacturers to integrate their trademarks more fully into their prod-
ucts or packaging—like Coke bottles and Toblerone bars—so that they can
make the case that the trademark as a copyrighted or patented design is an
important part of the value to consumers. In some cases, this may be true,
because the appearance of a product may be more important than its func-
tionality. Even if the feature itself is not easy to integrate, other ornamental
features can be physically integrated into the product. In such cases, the
import exception may not be appropriate, and the trademark owner should
prevail.  As a business strategy, “exploding” the trademark to encompass a
large part of the product design will succeed only if consumers find the
resulting design appealing, and only if the design remains nonfunctional in
the trademark sense.  In addition, the design should remain separable from
the utilitarian features of the product, so that it retains its intellectual prop-
erty protection under trademark, copyright, and design patent laws.360
Drawing on the Australian and Singaporean models, a statutory excep-
tion for incidental uses of copyright or design patents should include a non-
exhaustive list of the types of uses that should be exempt from restrictions
on importation and subsequent distribution. This will eliminate much of the
359. Because design patents enable original equipment manufacturers to monopolize the
market for automotive replacement parts, thus increasing the cost to consumers, proposed leg-
islation would reduce the duration of design patents for auto parts from fourteen (soon to be
fifteen) years to two-and-a-half years. See Promoting Automotive Repair Trade and Sales
(PARTS) Act, H.R. 1663 & S.780, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced April 23, 2013).
360. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(5) (2012) (barring trademark registration for functional
features); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of useful articles); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mar-
keting Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (holding that features of product design that were the
subject of an expired utility patent are presumed functional and therefore cannot be protected
by trademark law); Avia Group Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that feature that is primarily functional is not eligible for design
patent); Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143 (2d Cir. 1987)
(stating that applying Section 101 to deny copyright protection where utilitarian aspects of
useful article were inseparable from artistic aspects).
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uncertainty that would arise under a more general statutory test for “inciden-
tal uses.” Concern over such uncertainty troubled the Canadian Supreme
Court in Euro-Excellence.361 As illustrated by the Australian case law, how-
ever, relying entirely on a list of examples may force courts to engage in
difficult line drawing and strained interpretation in an effort to fit unantici-
pated uses under one of the delineated categories.362 Therefore, in addition to
a specific list of examples, the exception should include a catch-all excep-
tion for other incidental uses. While necessarily uncertain in scope, a catch-
all exception will serve as an important gap filler for the occasional inciden-
tal use that falls outside of the delineated categories.
With no analogous case law or statutory schemes to provide guidance in
this context, defining incidental uses is a novel undertaking. One promising
approach, however, is to consider how much value the patented or copy-
righted feature contributes to the overall commercial value of the individual
article.363 Where the contribution is insubstantial, then the presence of the
protected content should not preclude importation and sale of the article.
Where the patented or copyrighted feature also functions as a trademark, the
value of the feature should be calculated without regard to the value of the
goodwill that it represents. Because the plaintiff’s claim is not for trademark
infringement, but for copyright or design patent infringement, any reputa-
tional value adhering to the subject matter is irrelevant. If the feature in
question is copyrighted text, or an audiovisual or sound recording, it should
be valued according to its informational, artistic, or entertainment value. If
the feature is an ornamental design protected by copyright or design patent
law, it should be valued according to its ornamental value.
There is no established test for determining when the content protected
by copyright or a design patent represents an insubstantial portion of the
value of the article that embodies it. This determination, however, involves a
straightforward factual assessment of market values rather than a complex
balancing analysis such as fair use. Although the value of a copyright or
design patent as an intellectual property right may be substantial, the value
of the right does not reveal how much value a single copy of the protected
content contributes to the article that incorporates it.364 Once the inquiry is
focused on the value of a single copy of the protected work, the value of that
copy can be measured against the value of the merchandise it accompanies.
The ratio of values will in some cases make it easy to determine whether the
protected content is incidental to the total value. To use the earlier example,
361. Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 20, 29 (Can.).
362. See supra notes 216-229 and accompanying text (discussing Polo/Lauren and QS
Holdings)
363. Euro-Excellence Inc., [2007] S.C.R. at 67.
364. For example, the copyright in a motion picture may be worth millions of dollars, but
the value of a single DVD embodying the motion picture is likely to be less than twenty
dollars.
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a new computer is probably worth a great deal more than the decorative box
it arrives in. Therefore, the box involves an “incidental use” of copyright,
while the copyrighted software included with the computer probably contrib-
utes substantial value to the computer. The copyright in the box would be
incidental, while the copyright in the software may not be.
To take a different example, a single copy of a motion picture contrib-
utes significantly more to the value of the DVD embodying it than a single
copy of a label contributes to the value of the household appliance to which
it is affixed. In the case of design patents, the patented shape of an exterior
replacement part for an automobile may be the most significant factor in a
consumer’s purchasing decision; in that case, the patented feature makes a
substantial contribution to the value of the article. The shape of a bottle of
window cleaner, however, even if protected by a design patent, is unlikely in
most cases to contribute significantly to the value of the product, assuming
that its trademark value is ignored. While the value contributed by the copy-
righted or patented feature may be easy to assess in these cases, in closer
cases expert testimony may be required. In the case of a chocolate bar, for
example, a particularly appealing design (especially a novel one) might con-
tribute more to the product’s consumer appeal than the flavor of the choco-
late itself. One rarely buys a chocolate Easter bunny for its flavor.
By combining enumerated categories with a catch-all provision focused
on relative value, the exclusive importation rights of copyright and design
patent owners can be amended to incorporate an exception for accessories.
Drawing on the Australian model, the statute can treat certain items, such as
labels, as accessories per se. Unlike both the Australian and Singaporean
models, the catch-all provision would allow courts to consider, on a case-by-
case basis, certain incidental uses that fall outside of the per se category.
Combining these ideas into a single statute, the proposed statutory exception
for copyrights would provide:
Where a copyrighted work is incorporated in an accessory to an
article, the copyright embodied in the accessory is not infringed by
importing the accessory with the article, or by the domestic distribu-
tion of the imported accessory with the imported article, provided
that the accessory was made with the consent of the copyright
owner in the country where it was made.365
365. Alternatively, this proviso could be expanded to include any accessories the making
of which did not constitute an infringement in the country where they were made, even if the
copyright owner did not consent. This would encompass accessories made in countries where
the copyright had already expired, where the work did not qualify for copyright protection, or
where the copying was otherwise permitted by law. If this approach is adopted, it should apply
only if the country of manufacture adheres to the Berne Convention (Art. 5) or the TRIPS
Agreement (Art. 3(1)), two international agreements that impose minimum standards of copy-
right protection and require nondiscriminatory treatment of all works from signatory countries.
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For purposes of this section, an accessory is
(1) A label affixed to, displayed on, incorporated into the surface
of, or accompanying, the article;
(2) The packaging or container in which the article is packaged or
contained;
(3) A label affixed to, displayed on, incorporated into the surface
of, or accompanying, the packaging or container in which the
article is packaged or contained,
(4) A written instruction, a warranty, or other information pro-
vided with the article;
(5) A phonorecord embodying an instructional sound recording
provided with the article;
(6) A copy of an instructional audiovisual work provided with the
article; or
(7) Any other feature of the article, its packaging or its container,
or any accompanying object, that contributes an insubstantial
part of the value of the combination, apart from the trademark
value of the feature.
With minor modification, this language works equally well for design
patents.366
An importation exception along these lines would not cause the United
States to violate any of its obligations under multilateral international trade
or intellectual property agreements, which are agnostic on the question of
international exhaustion.367 Such  a carve-out is permitted even under the
proposed TPP provision that would require countries to block parallel im-
366. The exempting statute for design patents would read:
Where an ornamental design that is the subject of a design patent under section 171
is incorporated in an accessory to an article, the patented design embodied by the
accessory is not infringed by importing the accessory with the article, or by the
domestic distribution of the imported accessory with the imported article, provided
that the accessory was made with the consent of the owner of the design patent or
corresponding right in the country where it was made.
The reference to a “corresponding right” recognizes that some countries may protect de-
signs not with design patents but with industrial design registrations, copyrights, or other
mechanisms.
The design patent exemption would employ the same definition of “accessory” as the
copyright exemption. And, as in the case of copyrights, the consent proviso could be expanded
to encompass unauthorized copying in countries where the design patent had expired, where
the design did not qualify for protection, or where the copying was permitted by law, as long
as the country of manufacture was a TRIPS signatory.
367. Relevant agreements include the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, the TRIPS Agreement, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the Paris Conven-
tion for the Protection of Industrial Property.
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ports of copyrighted works. As noted earlier,368 provisions in the 2011 and
2013 drafts of the TPP would require signatories to give copyright owners
the right to block parallel imports. A footnote, however, clarifies the scope
of this requirement:
With respect to copies of works and phonograms that have been
placed on the market by the relevant right holder, the obligations
described in Article [4.2/QQ.G.3] apply only to books, journals,
sheet music, sound recordings and audio and visual works (i.e., cat-
egories of products in which the value of the copyrighted material
represents substantially all of the value of the product). Notwith-
standing the foregoing, each Party may provide the protection de-
scribed in Article [4.2/QQ.G.3] to a broader range of goods.369
Thus, even if the United States succeeds in persuading other TPP coun-
tries to give copyright owners the right to block imports of foreign-made
copies of their works, those countries will still be allowed to exempt prod-
ucts in which the copyrighted component does not represent “substantially
all the value” of the product. This leaves ample room for the proposed ex-
ception for accessories, including the catch-all provision for features that
contribute an “insubstantial part of the value” of the imported merchandise.
CONCLUSION
In regulating parallel imports of trademarked goods, trademark law at-
tempts to strike a balance between the interests of trademark owners and the
interests of consumers. By resorting to copyright law to block otherwise
lawful imports of genuine goods, trademark owners have succeeded in
avoiding the limitations imposed by trademark law, and have created a kind
of mutant trademark law.  When used in this manner, copyright law does
little to “promote the progress of science,”370 and suppresses competition
instead. This scenario has been played out in countries around the world.
Their judicial and legislative responses, though imperfect, have provided a
valuable learning opportunity.
In the United States, Kirtsaeng has changed the landscape of parallel
import law for copyright owners by ushering in a regime of international
copyright exhaustion. Whether this change will be permanent remains to be
368. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
369. TPP 2013 Draft, supra note 138, at 50 n. 135 ; TPP 2011 Draft, supra note 138, at
12 n.11. The same language appears in a side letter to the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agree-
ment. Letter from Minister Taı̈b Fassi Fihri to Ambassador Zoellick (June 15, 2004) available
at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/morocco/asset_upload_
file717_3850.pdf. However, no such language accompanies the U.S.–Jordan Free Trade
Agreement. Both of these agreements include the general proviso that authors be allowed to
block parallel imports of copyrighted works. See supra note 140.
370. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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seen. Copyright owners may pressure Congress to overturn international ex-
haustion regime, and the executive branch may support these efforts. Copy-
right owners may test the scope of the Court’s holding by assigning their
domestic and foreign copyrights to separate entities. Trademark owners may
also find that patent law—especially the law of design patents—offers an
alternative way to combat parallel imports.
If copyright and patent laws continue to offer trademark owners a type
of mutant trademark protection against parallel imports, then more monopo-
listic forms of protection will replace trademark law’s balancing of the inter-
ests of trademark owners and consumers. By studying the statutory and
judicial responses to similar developments in other countries, it is possible to
develop a legislative proposal to prevent this encroachment into trademark
law.
The legislation proposed in this article builds on the lessons derived
from these jurisdictions. By eliminating the expense and uncertainty that
would arise from case-by-case adjudication under existing doctrines such as
misuse, de minimis use, and fair use, none of which are well-suited to this
application, it gives clearer guidance to importers, distributors, and intellec-
tual property owners, while conserving judicial resources. It allows Congress
to maintain different parallel import regimes for copyrights, trademarks, and
design patents, allowing each of these regimes to be adjusted independently
as circumstances warrant, and it prevents trademark owners from substitut-
ing one regime for another by adding trivial content to their unprotected
goods. This approach will restore the preeminence of trademark law as the
proper mechanism for balancing the legitimate interests of trademark owners
and consumers.
